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Plain Meaning, Practical Reason, and Culpability:
Toward a Theory of Jury Interpretation of
Criminal Statutes
Darryl K. Brown*
In one of the few existing recordings of American juries deliber
ating in an actual criminal case, Wisconsin v. Reed,1 we observe ju
rors struggling with how they should apply a statute in a case in
which the facts are not in real dispute. The defendant is charged
with felon in possession of a gun, and all agree that he has a felony
record and owned a pistol until he turned it over to the police upon
their request. The statute contains three elements. The defendant
must (a) have a felony conviction, (b) have possessed a gun, and (c)
have known that he possessed the gun. Despite the apparent sim
plicity of the case, the jurors deliberate for two hours and acquit.
Their deliberations include some intriguing, and perhaps worri
some, statements. "I think we have more capabilities than to say,
one-two-three, these are met on a very simple level. I don't think,
as jurors, that is necessarily our role," says one juror. "Is he a
threat to society? - And if we decide he's guilty, is that just?" an
other asks. "What about sending a message? I'm thinking of a
message I'd like to send to the DA's office." In the latter part of
the discussion, jurors struggle to interpret this simple statute. "I'm
having trouble with that word 'gun,' but I'm really having trouble
with this word 'to know,' " says one. "Perhaps he didn't, in the full
sense of the word, know he possessed a firearm," suggests another.2
The Reed jury's acquittal is often described as nullification.3 Yet
the deliberation reveals jurors engaged in an extended, thoughtful,
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Dayton. B.A. 1984, East Carolina; M.A.
{American Studies) 1990, William and Mary; J.D. 1990, University of Vrrginia. - Ed. I
would like to thank Hal Krent, Errol Meidinger, Albert Moore, and John T. Perry for their
helpful comments on earlier drafts on this article. Participants on the jury research panel, led
by Stephan Landsman and Jonathan D. Casper at the 1997 Law and Society Association
Annual Meeting, also provided useful comments. Additionally, I am very grateful to Profes
sor Joseph Sanders of the University of Houston Law School for allowing me to make use of
his empirical data on jury deliberations. Fmally, thanks to Dean Fran Conte, who supported
this project with a faculty research grant.
1. See Frontline: Inside the Jury Room (PBS television broadcast, Apr. 8, 1986) (partial
transcript on file with author); see also STEPHEN J. ADLER, THE JuRY (1994); CBS Reports:
Enter the Jury Room (CBS television broadcast, Apr. 16, 1997).

2. See Frontline: Inside the Jury Room, supra note 1.
3. See infra note 232 and accompanying text.
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I will argue - necessary effort of statute application. Seen

as a project of statutory interpretation, the deliberation raises the
interesting issue of whether jurors interpret statutes in a manner
that at all resembles the well-studied strategies of judicial statutory
interpretation. The considerations that these jurors raise, it turns
out, mimic concerns familiar from judges' construction of statutes.

If jurors are sometimes led into complex interpretive debates, what
prompts this? Many would probably respond that untrained, undis
ciplined jurors are inclined to exceed the mandate that limits them
to "applying the law" to the facts they :find. Yet we already know
from the voluminous literature of statutory interpretation and from
earlier, legal-realist insights that "application" can be a compli
cated, value-laden, and ambiguous task rather than a rote, mechani
cal one.
The label "law application" obscures the complexity of the
jury's task. The considerable recent public law literature on statu
tory interpretation helps to clarify the creative, normative nature of
application, which inevitably entails a degree of law-creating and
policymaking. Law application is now widely seen as a complex,
dynamic process informed by substantive values and contextual
considerations rather than as a process determinatively guided by a
methodology such as plain meaning or drafters' intent.4 This litera
ture, however, is largely concerned with statutes in civil public law
contexts rather than criminal codes, and it is completely devoid of
any effort to describe how juries apply statutes.5 This is a deficiency
4. See generally WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
(1994); WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR. & Pmup P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEOIS·
LATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBuc POLICY 570 (2d ed. 1995) (asserting that
statutory interpretation is "very much an art and very much not a science"). See also T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. Rav. 20, 22 (1988)
(describing traditional approaches to interpretation as ainiing to "excavat[e] statutory mean
ing" through either textualism or intentionalism, and defending newer methods that take
account of changed circumstances and values); id. at 57 ("Interpreters [of statutes] are not
reporters or historians, searching out the facts of the past. They are creators of meaning.");
Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of Fed
eral Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1137, 1178 & n.222 (1990) (defining "a 'dynamic' interpre
tation of federal statutes" as one "in tension with the expectations of the enacting Congress
and perhaps with the statutory language, but compatible with contemporary values and con
text"); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a
Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REv. 1295, 1323 (1990) ("Statutory
language has no single or objective meaning. It, like legislative history, is subject to 'manipu
lation' (or, perhaps more accurately, interpretation)." (footnote omitted)); id. at 1366 (stating
that "there is no denying the policy component of statutory interpretation"). But see, e.g.,
ANroNIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 14-37 (1997); Antonin Scalia, The Rufe of
Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 1175 (1989) (arguing for a textualist approach to
statutory interpretation).

5. See, e.g., EsKRIDGE, supra note 4, at 70-74. Eskridge urges us to study statutory inter
pretation "from the bottom up" rather than concentrating on u.s ...supreme Court opinions.
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in the statutory interpretation literature, but it is a more serious gap
in studies of the jury.
Although modem juries apply law as well as find facts, they
rarely are given guidance in the application task, in contrast to the
considerable advice they receive on factfinding.6 Studies of the jury
tend to focus on its factfinding task, in part because that process
raises issues of keen interest to trial lawyers and litigants, such as
what sorts of evidence jurors find persuasive and what biases affect
their findings.7 Many studies explore issues related to law applica
tion, such as the role that norms or notions of justice may play in
verdicts, particularly when those views conflict with the plain mean
ing of statutes and other jury instructions.8 Yet few studies directly
address the issue of how juries interpret legal language rather than
trump it with compelling normative concerns or personal biases.
Social science literature often relies on inadequate conceptions of
statutory application to assess juries, assuming that juries either
He also laments the "juriscentric" bias in statutory interpretation study and notes that much
interpretation is done by people other than judges. Yet he never mentions juries. See id.; see
also EsKRIDGE & FruCKEY, supra note 4.

6. State and federal jury instructions convey to juries a reductionist image of application
as rote and mechanical. They typically say no more about applying statutes than such com
mands as "[i]t is your duty as jurors to follow the law as stated in all of the instructions of the
Court and to apply these rules of law to the facts as you find them." 1 EDWARD J. DEVTIT ET
AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 12.01, at 325 (4th ed. 1992); see also id.
at 326-29 (collecting instructions used in several federal circuits); id. § 12.02-.08, at 331-48,
§§ 15-16, at 403-545 (collecting jury instructions that guide evidence interpretation and
factfinding). Modem juries have lost their broad authority from an earlier era to "judge" the
law. See Sparf & Hansen v. Uuited States, 156 U.S.51, 74 (1895) (rejecting a federal jury's
right to nullify); JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY 67-88 (1994) (recounting the history of
jury nullification power and judicial responses to it); Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G.
Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U.Cm. L. REv. 867, 90307 (1994); Morris S. Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex
Civil Litigation, 128 U.PA. L.REv. 829, 848 (1980); William E. Nelson, The Eighteenth Cen
tury Background ofJohn Marshall's Jurisprudence, 76 MICH. L. REv. 893, 904-17 (1978).
7. For an anthology of social science literature addressing jury issues that demonstrates
the emphasis on issues of factfinding accuracy and sources of bias, see JuRIES: FORMATION
AND BEHAVIOR (Robert M. Krivoshey ed., 1994). Legal scholars, who have drawn from
coguitive science research for more utilitarian studies of jury decisionmaking, also concen
trate on jury factfinding. See, e.g., Albert Moore, Trial by Schema, 37 UCLA L. REv. 273
(1989). Co=only expressed concerns about the jury's role in the legal system, such as its
ability to understand complex statistical or scientific evidence, also implicate its factfinding
role.
8. Hastie concluded that such research thus far has explored insufficiently the "role of
'the juror's sense of justice' in juror decisions" or "where jurors' ultimate verdicts are guided
by considerations of fairness, equity and justice." Reid Hastie, Introduction to INSIDE THE
JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING 28-29 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993); see
also Caton F. Roberts et al., Verdict Selection Processes in Insanity Cases, 17 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 261, 262 (1993) (noting that, with regard to guilty-but-mentally-ill verdicts, "the na
ture of the psychological processes underlying the decisional effects ...on lay persons' ver
dicts has remained relatively unexplored" and that "[w]e do not have an understanding of the
decisional mechanisms responsible" for such verdicts).
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"follow"and "apply"the law or ignore it to follow their own senses
of justice, preferences, or biases.9
Courts and legal scholars have done no better. One prominent
jury scholar, Reid Hastie, recently noted that "[i]ntuitions ... about
how jurors will behave have been the primary source of guidance
for the formation and application of legal policies," especially by
courts.10 "The result has been a reactive, fragmented, and some
times incoherent collection of speculations about juror behavior."11
This simplistic understanding of law application is reflected in jury
instructions and much jury research, and it conflicts with our com
plex picture of statutory construction by judges and agencies.12
9. Even leading social science scholars brush over the issue of the interpretive process
with limited observations such as "[the jury] sometimes bends the law to comport with its
own sense of what is just, fair, and equitable. Some will argue that this is still wrong, the law
should always be followed." VALERIE P. HANs & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING TIIE JURY 163
(1986) (emphasis added); see also James P. Levine, The Legislative Role ofJuries, 1984 AM.
B. FoUND. Rss. J. 605, 609 ("Do juries generally follow the frequent admonitions of judges
that they must apply the law as is ...or to do they ...register the public pulse . . ?"). Biii
see NoRMAN J. FINKEL, CoMMONSENSE JUSTICE: JURORS' NonoNS OF TIIB LAW 279-97
(1995) (discussing how jurors "construe" insanity instructions rather than either follow them
literally or ignore them).
10. Hastie, supra note 8, at 4. Examples of courts using intuitions about juror behavior in
this manner include McClesky v.Kemp, 481 U. S.279 (1987); Lockhart v.McCree, 476 U.S.
162 (1986); Johnson v.Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S.404
(1972).
11. Hastie, supra note 8, at 4.
12. Neither do scholars address jurors' interpretation task on another common occasion
for examining jury decisionmaking: the debate over nullification. The nullification decision,
as traditionally conceived, follows the statutory interpretation task. That is, once jurors de
cide what the law means and how it is supposed to be applied, they decide whether they will
do so, or instead ignore the law to serve some other goal or value. But see infra section
m.D.2 (citing studies by Irwin A. Horowitz finding that nullification instructions can affect
the factfinding discussion in jury deliberations and suggesting that the factual "story" that
jurors compose is itself contingent on the law to be applied to it, as well as compelling norma
tive concerns). Scholars addressing nullification tend to discuss the issue in a dichotomous
framework: juries either should or should not be able to ignore law on occasion in order to
pursue justice that law would not achieve. Thus conceived, this discussion also skips over the
jury's interpretation of law.
A more subtle view of nullification, however, places such verdicts on a continuum with
verdicts that literally and uncontroversially apply law, and thereby understands nullification
verdicts as interpretive acts that reconcile legal rules with concerns of context, public values,
and consequences of application. Cf. Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule of
Law, 81 MINN. L. REv. 1149 (1997) (suggesting that, under prevailing conceptions of the rule
of law, some verdicts that seem to be nullification may in fact be principled decisions that
enforce legal rules that conflict with the statute at issue). George Fletcher has argued that
nullification is an "unfortunate and misleading" term, because it suggests "an act of disre
spect toward the law." GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD
GOETZ AND TIIB LAw ON TRIAL 154 (1988). He argues that many nullification verdicts strive
"not to defeat the law, but to perfect the law, to realize the law's inherent values." Id. That
view opens the way for exploring jury applications of law as interpretive acts akin to those
that judges accomplish. Fletcher, however, does not develop that description, and he de
scribes nullification verdicts as "the jury vot[ing] its conscience," id., with little consideration
of legal and extralegal interpretive tools jurors use to overcome the strong feeling - en
couraged by standard instructions - that they should literally apply legal rules.
.
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What constitutes "bending" the law and whether a given construc
tion counts as "following" the law - what, in short, constitutes a

normatively appropriate application of law - are questions that the
study of statutory interpretation pursues. Many of the cases that
juries decide are likely to pose significant interpretive issues. Most
cases settle before trial, so those that go to juries are disproportion
ately hard or close in some way. Many are close only because of
factual disputes;13 but some significant portion also pose significant
rule-interpretation issues, which typically are difficult because text,
purpose, justice, and other context concerns point in different direc
tions.14 Limited conceptions of statutory construction lead to ill
founded criticisms of juries' interpretive approaches and decisions
because they presuppose an untenable formalism for rule applica
tion. A more complex description of interpretive practice prompts
reassessment of how well juries employ instructions and apply law.
This article offers a preliminary theory of how juries apply crim
inal rules and aims to add to the study of juries a new recognition of
jurors as interpreters of statutes. I build this theory on new analysis
of two jury deliberation data sets, supplemented by review of ear
lier empirical studies. The first source is the recording of the delib
eration in Wisconsin v. Reed. The second is a set of eight mock jury
deliberations based on a single theft case,

Michigan

v.

Harris.

The

tools of statutory interpretation scholarship yield insights on how
juries resolve difficult problems of law application. This article also
builds that analysis from empirical research in the behavioral sci
ences, support underutilized in legal scholarship on statutory
interpretation.
This focus on jury interpretation of statutes, in turn, provides
insights into a central project of criminal adjudication. Criminal
law scholarship emphasizes at the conceptual level that criminal
judgments are individualized assessments of moral culpability. A
focus on jury application of statutes allows us to explore how such
evaluations actually are accomplished at the "ground level" of indi
vidual case adjudication. At this level we see in action the tension
13. Easy rule-application decisions typically are so because all interpretive concerns plain meaning, purpose, justice of the outcome - point the same way once facts are deter
mined. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L.
REv. 1007, 1018, 1065, 1082 (1989) (asserting that public values have less influence in statu
tory application decisions when the text being interpreted is clear and supported by other
factors such as legislative history or statutory purpose).
14. Cf. HARRY KAI.VEN, JR. & HANs ZErsEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 164-66, 43 2-33 (1966)
(offering a "liberation hypothesis," based on extensive research of actual jury decisionmak
ing, that suggests that jurors allow values and norms to affect decisions primarily when the
evidence in a case is weak or close).
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between a core"rule-of-law value - consistent application of stat
utes across cases - with criminal law's goal of judging each defend
ant's culpability individually. The latter requires a morally attuned
inquiry in which finding the breach of a conduct rule is merely a
prerequisite rather than the complete analysis. Yet reaching judg
ments through statutory interpretation informed by broader public
values and norms may seem to jeopardize both the rule of law and
the democratic legitimacy of adjudication.15
Similar tensions occur within the jury's decision. Jurors must
interpret law in order to apply it, and that interpretive process oc
curs in a broad context of considerations beyond the text's plain
meaning or the legislature's intent. Juries interpret statutes in light
of the factual context revealed at trial; the purposes to which the
statute is being put (and may be put generally); instrumental con
cerns such as the incentive effects of a judgment; public values,16
common notions of justice, and social norms; and the jury's institu
tional role in the larger justice system.
Part I of this article sets the stage by discussing the unique func
tion of criminal law and the special set of demands it imposes on
the interpretation of criminal statutes. Part II elaborates the practi
cal reasoning approach to statutory interpretation, drawing on
sources in hermeneutics and pragmatism.17 Part III surveys existing
social science research for empirical evidence on jury decisionmak
ing and, in particular, interpretive methods. Though few studies fo
cus explicitly on interpretation of statutory language as opposed to
nullification or miscomprehension of statutes, the literature sug
gests that juries use interpretive practices that are captured by de
scriptions of dynamic construction and practical reasoning.
Part IV then uses the practical-reasoning model, informed by
empirical research, to study the jury-deliberation data. The Reed
deliberation reveals a rich, complex process of statutory interpreta15. For a general discussion of how contemporary approaches to statutory interpretation
are all grounded in a vision of democratic legitimacy, see Jane S.Schacter, Metademocracy:
The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REv. 593
(1995).
16. Public values, as I use the term here, refer to widely held social norms that have some
grounding in legal and political culture. See Eskridge, supra note 13, at 1007-08 (defining
public values as "legal norms and principles that form fundamental underlying precepts for
our polity- background norms that contribute to and result from the moral development of
our political community ... [those that] appeal to conceptions of justice and the common
good, not to the desires of just one person or group").
17. This description is well developed in the literature on judicial interpretation. Those
familiar with it may want to' skim or skip this part, though here it serves to connect the
function of criminal adjudication, described in Part I, with the empirical findings about juror
decisionmaking explored in the next two Parts.
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tion that shares many strategies with judicial methods. Further, it
finds the jury employing its interpretive strategy to fulfill the norm
ative function of criminal law described in Part I. Next, I examine
the set of mock jury deliberations in Michigan v. Harris, a fictional
property theft case.18 Facing a different problem of construction
and different normative concerns, the Harris juries use a similarly
sophisticated process.

Despite close attention to statutory lan

guage, the Harris juries ·experienced somewhat less success at
achieving a defensible judgment of moral culpability and with using
public-values analysis. This final Part suggests a descriptive theory
of jury interpretation of criminal statutes. Concluding remarks dis
cuss implications of this study for criminal law's conceptual purpose
of normative judgment, for the related, practical purpose of revising
jury instructions, and for the future direction of research on juries
and statutory application.19
I.

THE FUNCTIONS OF CRIMINAL STATUTES AND

THE

PURPOSE

OF CRIMINAL JUDGMENT
The contemporary nature of criminal law creates a special set of
problems for statutory application arising from the multiple func
tions that criminal rules serve. Criminal statutes long have been
understood as serving two distinct functions.2° First, criminal stat
utes announce "conduct rules" to the general public, giving them ex
ante warning about the standards to which they must conform their
behavior in order to avoid criminal punishment.21 Statutes tell us
what conduct is prohibited or, occasionally, required. Second, crim18. Harris is based closely on Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952). For further
description of this study, see infra section IV.B.
19. Although this article deals only with jury interpretation of criminal statutes, many of
the interpretive practices are likely the same for juries on civil cases. The implications of
these interpretive practices will differ somewhat because the civil jury need not evaluate
moral culpability.Additionally, I focus solely on substantive law statutes, as opposed to rules
governing such procedural issues as assessing witness credibility and circumstantial evidence,
or rules specifying the burden of proof and presumption of innocence. Such rules require
interpretation as well, and surely affect culpability assessment, but I have not explored those
implications here.
20. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in
Criminal Law, 91 HARv. L. REv. 625, 626 (1984) (citing JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT
ON GOVERNMENT AND AN lNrRooucnoN TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLA
TION 430 (W. Harrison ed., 1948) {1776 & 1789)); Kent Greenawalt, A Vice ofIts Virtues:
The Perils of Precision in Criminal Codification, as Illustrated by Retreat, General Justifica
tion, and Dangerous Utterances, 19 RUTGERS LJ. 929 {1988); Paul H.Robinson, A Functional
Analysis of Criminal Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 857 {1994) [hereinafter Robinson, Functional
Analysis]; Paul H. Robinson, Rules of Conduct and Principles ofAdjudication, 51 U. Cm. L.
REv. 729 (1990) [hereinafter Robinson, Rules of Conduct].
21. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 20, at 626, 630.
'
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inal statutes provide "decision rules" or principles for adjudicating
individual cases of conduct-rule violations.22 Decision rules are di
rected at those who adjudicate cases rather than at the general pub
lic.

Although scholars typically consider judges as the primary

audience for these rules, and prosecutors when they make charging
decisions as a secondary audience, criminal juries also are guided by
these rules. While conduct rules need to be clear and simple, so
that all citizens can readily understand and follow them, decision
rules often must be more subtle and complicated, in order to "take
account of the complex and varied situational factors relevant to an
actor's blameworthiness, as well as the capacities and characteristics
of the particular actor."23
Many defenses are easy to understand as decision rules. If we
take the crime of assault as a typical conduct rule, the defense of
duress can be understood as a decision rule. The conduct rule is
violated if the defendant hits the victim, but the defendant may not
be held liable if he was under duress to hit the victim - if he suc
cumbed to pressure to which most people, including his judge and
jury, would yield.24 The conduct rule is directed to the defendant:
"don't intentionally hit others." The decision rule guides the assess
ment of whether his conduct-rule violation is blameworthy. The de
fendant hit the victim, but he did not do so voluntarily, in the sense
that we construct voluntariness with regard to fair options and cir
cumstances. His conduct in the context of the duress he faced is not
blameworthy. Note that it is not necessary for the defendant to
know of such a decision rule when trying to conform his conduct to
the law. All he needs to know is the conduct rule; presumably the
duress decision rule only applies when the defendant would yield to
the duress whether he knew of that decision rule or not.25
Decision rules also arise within the basic elements of an offense.
For example, the mental elements of offenses often function as de
cision rules; they are not necessary to formulate the rule announc
ing prohibited conduct. The conduct rule for theft, for example,
forbids taking the property of another. But one who violates that
rule - who takes another's property - may not be guilty if he
lacked the requisite mens rea, which may require knowledge or
22. See id. "Principles of adjudication" is Robinson's phrase, see Robinson, Rules of Con
duct, supra note 20, at 731, while Dan-Cohen uses "decision rule," see Dan-Cohen, supra
note 20, at 627. This article generally uses the phrase "decision rules."
23. Robinson, Rules of Conduct, supra note 20, at 732.
24. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 20, at 633; Robinson, Rules of Conduct, supra note 20, at
744.
25. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 20, at 630-42 (discussing duress).
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purpose when he was merely negligent or even reasonably careful
but still wrong about the property's rightful owner. Similarly, homi
cide rules forbid conduct likely to result in taking the life of an
other. But the mens rea elements function as decision rules
because the degree of one's liability depends on one's mental state;
defendants who do the same conduct and cause the same harm will
be judged differently depending on whether their acts were pur
poseful, reckless, or negligent.26
Not all mental elements function solely as decision rules. The
mens rea requirements of attempt offenses, for example, serve to
define the prohibited conduct.27 I will not elaborate on the com
plexities of which elements across the typical array of crimes serve
which functions; that work has been done well by others.28 For the
purposes of this article, it is important simply to note that mental
state elements often serve the key function of guiding the liability
decision, and that is so even in the simplest of crimes, such as theft
and possession offenses. As we will see, when jurors struggle with a
difficult liability decision, they frequently focus on mental state ele
ments. This typically occurs when the violation of a conduct rule is
clear but the defendant's blameworthiness for that violation is not.
The distinction between conduct rules and decision rules is use
ful for understanding the normative nature of criminal law and thus
the normative nature of the application of criminal statutes. Crimi
nal judgments carry a special condemnation of moral blameworthi
ness that violations of other rules - say, tort rules - do not. Each
criminal adjudication assesses not only whether a conduct-rule vio
lation occurred, but also whether the violation is blameworthy.29
The terms of criminal statutes, then, are normative as well as posi
tive; a guilty verdict is a moral as well as descriptive judgment.
Although a guilty verdict is at bottom a moral assessment of blame26. See, e.g., JosHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING
(describing varieties of homicide).

CRIMINAL LAW 463-505 (2d ed. 1995)

27. See Robinson, Rules of Conduct, supra note 20, at 737.
28. See Robinson, Functional Analysis, supra note 20; Robinson, Rules of Conduct, supra
note 20.
29. See PETER BREIT, AN INQUIRY INTO CRIMINAL GUILT 40 (1963); GEORGE P.
FLETCHER, REnilNKING CRIMINAL LAW 395-401, 532-38 (1978) (describing "persistent ten
sions in legal terminology ... between the descriptive and normative uses of the same terms,"
and recounting "a normative theory of guilt," rather than a merely descriptive one, that
emerged in the nineteenth century); SANFORD H. KADISH, BLAME AND PumsHMENT:
EssAYS IN CRIMINAL LAW 65-106 (1987) (contrasting positivists' focus on social dangerous
ness as the basis for criminal sanction with the dominant concern with blameworthiness and
"moral innocence," which explains mens rea requirements ·and excuses such as the insanity
defense); Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal
Law, 96 CoLUM. L. REv. 269, 301-46 (1996).
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worthiness, the inquiry should not be an ad hoc one guided solely
by the judge or jury's moral intuitions. Rather, decision rules guide
the judgment; those rules strive, with only partial success, to insure
a consistency of moral standards across cases and conduct rules.3°
They also aim to limit the decisionmaker, who, after all, can dictate
governmental control of a citizen's liberty.
A criminal verdict is inevitably an individualized assessment of
the defendant's character. It evaluates his judgment in choosing a
particulru;- course of action in particular circumstances. In doing so,
the verdict serves criminal law's expressive function of assessing the
moral quality of his judgment, and thereby his character.31 Crimi
nal law requires not simply that we obey rules, but that each person
"pursue his chosen ends with a due regard for us - with a certain
amount of maturity, disinterestedness, and perspicacity."32 We con
. demn wrongdoers not solely for violating rules but "also for exhibiting the kind of character failing associated with insufficient
commitment to the moral norms embodied in the community's
criminal law."33
In making such judgments we often become acutely aware of
the limited, indeterminate nature of criminal statutes for this nor
mative purpose. Criminal law is always an incomplete restatement
of morality and social norms. Criminal statutes - even decision
rules, which refine our judgment of conduct-rule violations - inevi
tably lack the nuance to control fully the particularized moral judg
ment of a defendant's conduct in his specific context.34 Kyron
Huigens argues:

30. Cf. Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HAR.v. L. REv. 1 423, 1465 (1995)
(arguing that no juror e xercising practical reason "proceed[s] every step of the way mak ing
highly particularized decisions - that would be impossible," and that jurors "must generalize
from past experience").
31. See R.B. Brandt, A Motivational Theory ofExcuses in the Criminal Law, in CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: NoMos XXVII 165 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds. , 1985) (arguing
that " criminal liability requires a motivational fault" so that criminal law punishes only those
whose "behavior is a result of some defect of standing motivation (one might say 'character'
instead)"); Henr y M. Hart, Jr. , The Aims ofthe Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CoNTEMP. PRons.
401 (1958).
32. Huigens, supra note 30, at 1 424.
33. Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance ofLaw Is an Excuse - But Only for the Virtuous, 96 MICH.
L. REv. 127, 1 30 (1997).
34. See Greenawalt, supra note 20, at 929 (discussing "the problem of precision in crimi
nal codes"). Greenawalt argues that because "the need for relatively concise language im·
poses constraint" and " [u]nless a formulation is to be wholly open-ended
only a limite d
number of factors can be taken into account," id. at 929, there is a need for judicial interpre·
tation, and "judges should feel less constrained than is ordinarily appropriate by the evident
import of the words chosen for the statute" if "situations are really extraordinary," id. at 950.
See also Kahan, supra note 33, at 129. See generally HANs-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND
METHon 38 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall trans., 2d rev. ed. 1989) (" [T]he order·
• • .
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[R]ules and standards . . . are and should remain heuristic devices:
they do not actually serve a public, prescriptive role. Having arrived
at a rule, we ought to return our attention to the individual case it is
supposed to explain....[D]efenses are legislated only in bare outline,
and ...our true object of study is the actual, individualized adjudica
tion of a person by a jury....
What is at issue in the trial is the pattern of individual choices that
led to the act and hence to the harm. The factfinder, in deciding the
case, will accept or reject the decision the actor made in the circum
stances she faced .. . . The jurors will accept or reject the particular
conception of the good and the scheme of ends that led the actor into
the conflict and to the resulting harm.5
3

The tensions in criminal statutes arising from their dual func
tions36 - and from the moral nature of the judgment they guide
but cannot fully embody - are addressed in large part by the insti
tution of the jury.37 Thus, the jury's task is a diffi cult one: to make
individualized moral judgments through application of indetermi
nate rules with terms that must be given· normative content from
broadly held social norms.3s
ing of life by the rules of law and morality is incomplete and needs productive supplementa
tion. Judgment is necessary in order to make a correct evaluation of the concrete instance.").
35. Huigens, supra note 30, at 1439.
36. Unfortunately, neither contemporary criminal codes nor the instructions that transmit
them were written with the distinction between conduct rules and decision rules in mind.
Statutes are written to serve both the conduct and decision purposes at once; following the
influential Model Penal Code, state criminal codes are designed largely around distinctions
between mens rea and actus reus elements, and between offenses and defenses. As a result,
statutes at times may not serve either function well. The key purpose of recent criminal law
scholarship on this topic, by such leading scholars as Meir Dan-Cohen and Paul Robinson,
has been to identify and clarify these multiple functions served by criminal statutes, and
thereby to provide a basis both for a general critique of current codes and for code revision.
See generally Dan-Cohen, supra note 20; Robinson, Rules of Conduct, supra note 20. This
distinction between the parts of statutes that primarily define criminal conduct and those that
aim to guide adjudication in response to such conduct creates tension in statutory
application.
37. See Huigens, supra note 30, at 1466 ("We employ juries because we place the person
prior to the rule, because we are sensitive to the possibility that none of the rules may be
adequate to describe justice in the given situation, and because the rules may conflict in a
way that only human hands can unravel."); Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 29, at 309-10
(noting the assumption of modem courts that "juries are generally better at making fact
specific appraisals of defendants' emotions," which underlie the normative judgments of
criminal law).
38. This task calls to mind Rawls's description of "reflective equilibrium," in which we
check the seeming mandates of a rule applied to particular facts against our "considered
judgment" about the proper outcome of that case. See JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
48-51 (1971 ). When rule application and judgment about outcome conflict, Rawls describes a
process of mediating the two concerns until a judgment in the case yields reflective equilib
rium between the two sources of judgment. See id. at 17-53. We can also note here the
similarity to Llewellyn's context-sensitive description of legal reasoning and judicial decision
making. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
221-22 (1962) [hereinafter LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE] ; see also KARL N. LLEWELLYN,
THE CoMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 268-85 (1960) [hereinafter LLEWELLYN,
CoMMON LAw] (describing "situation sense").
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The delicacy of the problem speaks to the importance of analyz
ing closely how the jury actually accomplishes or fails at this task.
That analysis is the goal of Part IV. To acquire some analytical
tools for that study, however, it is helpful first to review the sub
stantial scholarship on statutory interpretation by public-law schol
ars, 39 who h a v e put more effort recently into statutory
interpretation theory than criminal law scholars. In particular, they
have developed a contemporary understanding of practical reason
ing as a persuasive description of judicial interpretation. This un
derstanding fits closely with the contemporary view of criminal
culpability as a judgment on character.
II.
A.

JURY VERDICTS AS PRACTICAL REASON

Practical Reasoning in Statutory Interpretation

Over roughly the last two decades, public-law scholars have de
veloped descriptions of judicial decisionmaking - particularly of
statutory interpretation and constitutional judicial review - based
on the model of practical reasoning. Practical reasoning stands in
sharp contrast to more traditional models of legal reasoning. Tradi
tional approaches start with foundational principles from which,
through deductive analysis, one arrives at a judgment for a particu
lar case. These approaches define successful interpretation as ad
herence to a method. They typically posit that either the text,
legislative intent, or the overarching purpose of the rule should
guide application; all share the presupposition that such a first prin
ciple or grand theory can guide and control rule application.40 In
this sense the traditional approaches strive for an objectivism that
minimizes reference to the context of the decision.41 They also seek
to restrict the discretion of rule interpreters (courts) and thereby
exclude the influence of contemporary values or personal prefer
ences. They strive generally to minimize the substantive content of
the interpretive process and to make rule application determinate.42
39. While criminal law is a species of public law, it is traditionally considered separately
from the preoccupations of other public law areas, most typically constitutional law, adminis
trative law, and legislation studies.
40. See William N. Eskridge, Jr.& Philip P.Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN.L. REv. 321, 324-45 (1990); Zeppos, supra note 4, at 1310-35, 1368 (criti
cizing textualism and the formalist "idea that there must be a foundationalist theory to dic
tate predictable outcomes").
- 41. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 40, at 324-45.
. 42.See id.; see also Schacter, supra note 15 (describing four approaches to statutory inter
pretation built upon differing notions of democratic theory).
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A considerable number of scholars have argued that none of the
traditional approaches effectively achieves these goals.43 More

broadly, they deny the possibility of acontextual decisionmaking
that ignores all considerations except relevant first principles such
as the plain meaning of the statute.44 Practical reasoning under
stands decisionmaking as inductive and polycentric, drawing from
an interconnected "web of beliefs" or shared, but sometimes con
flicting, community values and norms. This approach recognizes
the situated nature of reasoning that includes both the context of
the case and the community of the decisionmakers. Judgments can
not be objectively verified as correct under this model, but they can
be checked for both their degree of fit with the relevant conl.mu
nity's web of beliefs and their success at accommodating competing
concerns. Such reasoning can be understood as a practice midway
between purely ad hoc, subjective judgment at one end and the
ideal of foundationalist, objective decisionmaking at the other.45
Legal scholars who have developed practical reasoning descrip
tions of judicial decisionmaking rely on several sources for the
model.

Some trace their premises back to Aristotle's idea of

phronesis, the quality of situated moral judgment, employing it as a
model for reaching appropriate answers to specific cases without a
universal or objective theory of what is right.46 Practical reason43. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 4, (criticizing traditional "archeological" models of
applying statutes); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 40, at 324-45; Daniel A. Farber, The Inevi
tability ofPractical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule ofLaw, 45 VAND L. REv. 533,
544-49 (1992) (offering a critique of formalist approaches to interpretation); Jay M.Feinman,
Practical Legal Studies and Critical Legal Studies, 87 MICH. L. REv. 724, 724-25 (1988) ("The
traditional analytic [description of how judges decide cases] has been that judges apply for
mal methods of legal reasoning . . . . That response has been untenable for a generation or
more; thus [practical reasoning] has moved to informal legal reasoning as a description of
adjudication ...."); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HAR.v.
L. REv. 405, 414-23 (1989) (critiquing plain meaning); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's
Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 1597, 1620-33 (1991)
(same).
44. See RICHARD A. PosNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A M!sUNDERSTOOD RELATION
107-09 (1988); Daniel A.Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories out of School: An Essay
on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REv. 807, 820 (1993); Zeppos, supra note 4, at 1349-50
(discussing formalism's assumptions in contrast to less determinate statutory interpretation
approaches).
45. See Zeppos, supra note 4, at 1341 (asserting that absence of choice due to a con
straining methodology need not be the only measure of interpretive legitimacy).
46. See Aru:STOTLE, NrcoMACHEAN ETFllcs bks. V-VI (Hippocrates G. Apostle trans.,
1984); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 40, at 323; Huigens, supra note 30, at 1454-55 (describ
ing one who possesses practical reason as "not simply know[ing] universal truths," but rather
having "the capacity to integrate the universal and the particular: to identify and pursue the
good amid the contingencies of practical human affairs" and "generat[e] flexible, creative
responses ... without relying on doctrine or ideology, without demanding certainty"). But
see Mark V. Tushnet, Anti-Formalism in Recent Constitutional Theory, 83 MICH. L. REv.
1502, 1534-36 (1985) (arguing that the social conditions for the widespread practice of Aristo.

-
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ing's more contemporary roots build on the tradition of American
pragmatism, which abandons attempts to ground knowledge and
judgment in foundations outside of history and context,47 and from
legal realists' understandings of legal reasoning, such as Karl
Llewellyn's notion of "situation sense" and descriptions of judicial
decisionmaking.48
The practical-reasoning model draws from hermeneutics the ac
knowledgement that decisionmakers inevitably bring their own
"prejudices and fore-meanings"49 - or background preunderstand
ings, perspectives, and values - to the interpretive task. "The real
meaning of a text . . . does not depend on the contingencies of the
author and his original audience. . . . [I]t is always co-determined
also by the historical situation of the interpreter . . . ."5° For
Gadamer, "situation" implies "a standpoint that limits the possibil
ity of vision," or more simply, a "horizon" that "includes everything
that can be seen from a particular vantage point."51 Hermeneutics,
and practical-reasoning strategies that borrow from it, seeks to in
form or "fuse" the interpreter's limited horizon with other horizons,
including those of the text's author and the text's historical ori
gins.52 One cannot separate application, the present situation and
telian practical reasoning no longer exist). Practical reasoning's contemporary development
in legal interpretation literature, however, largely ignores Aristotle's connection of practical
judgment to the larger ethical issues of personal character and pursuit of the good. See gener
ally Huigens, supra note 30; see also Miriam Galston, Taking Aristotle Seriously: Republican
Oriented Legal Theory and the Moral Foundation of Deliberative Democracy, 82 CAL. L.
REv. 331 (1994) (criticizing legal scholars for making superficial use of Aristotle's work).
47.

See RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND 0BJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM (1983};
RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND SOLIDARITY (1989).

RICHARD

48. See LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 38; see also Farber, supra note 43, at
535-41 (discussing the connection between Llewellyn and current practical-reasoning
models).
49. See GADAMER, supra note 34, at 294-95. See generally GEORGIA WARNKE,
GADAMER: HERMENEUTICS, TRADmoN AND REAsoN (1987). For a legal scholar's use of
Gadamer, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 CoLUM. L. REv.
609 (1990).
50. GADAMER, supra note 34, at 296. "That is why understanding is not merely a repro
ductive but always a productive activity as well." Id.
51.

Id. at 302.

52. See id. at 306. This is roughly the idea of the "hermeneutic circle,'' which posits that
because the whole can be understood only by analyzing its parts, and each part only with
reference to the whole, one should attempt to build a more sophisticated understanding of an
issue by alternating between perspectives of the whole and the various parts. For a compara
ble descriptive idea developed from studies of juror factfinding processes, see W. LANCE
BENNETI & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, REcoNSTRUCilNG REALITY IN nm COURTROOM: Jus.
TICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CuLTURE 49-50 (1981) ("[T]hese studies suggest [that]
the interpreter shifts among the information or sets of symbols that have been assimilated,
the emerging idea that seems to be the point of the story, and new bits of information or
groups of symbols. The emerging set of connections and constraints guides the listener's use
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use for which one interprets a text, from understanding.53 Just as,
following Aristotle, one cannot determine a right course of action
independently of the situation, even though that decision is in
formed by general values, one cannot arrive at a correct textual in
terpretation separately from the context to which it is applied.54
Practical-reasoning scholarship concedes some degree of discre
tion and indeterminacy in statutory interpretation. Its advocates
acknowledge that decisionmaking "involves creativity and choice
among competing arguments and values,"55 and in that sense is a
means of policymaking.56 While its methods are not clearly deline
ated, because practical reasoning is more a mode of cognitive activ
ity or practice than a method or set of rules,57 the considerations
one weighs in employing practical reasoning are familiar. As
Eskridge and Frickey describe the process in their study of U.S.
Supreme Court decisions, an interpreter will look at "a broad range
of evidence" to form "a preliminary view of the statute."
The interpreter then develops that preliminary view by testing various
possible interpretations against the multiple criteria of fidelity to the
text, historical accuracy, and conformity to contemporary circum
stances and values. Each criterion is relevant, yet none necessarily
trumps the others. Thus while an apparently clear text, for example,
will create insuperable doubts for a contrary interpretation if the
other evidence reinforces it .. . an apparently clear text may yield if
other considerations cut against it . . .5s
.

of the vast store of background knowledge about social life that
interpretation.").

is

necessary for sensible

53. See GADAMER, supra note 34, at 307-08. Gadamer also states that
the person "applying" law [at times may] have to refrain from applying the full rigor of
the law. • . . In restraining the law, he is not diminishing it but, on the contrary, finding
the better law. . . • [E]very law is in a necessary tension with concrete action, in that it is
general and hence cannot contain practical reality in its full concreteness. . ..The law is
always deficient, not because it is imperfect in itself but because human reality is neces
sarily imperfect in comparison to the ordered world of law, and hence allows of no sim
ple application of the law.
Id. at 318.
54. See id. at 312-17; see also LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 38, at 221-22.
55. Frickey, supra note 4, at 1218; see also GADAMER, supra note 34, at 296

("[U]nderstanding is not merely a reproductive but always a productive activity as well.");
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 40, at 345-47.

56. See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 40, at 345; Frickey, supra note 4, at 1201
(concluding that "formalism in interpretation . . . has not governed many important federal
Indian law cases").
57. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P.Frickey, Practical Reason and the First Amendment,
34 UCLA L. REv. 1615, 1616 (1987); cf. GADAMER, supra note 34, at 295 (arguing that her
meneutics is not a " 'procedure' or method" but a clarification of "the conditions in which
understanding takes place," which always includes "[t]he prejudices and fore-meanings that
occupy the interpreter's consciousness").

58. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 40, at 352. For a refinement of the theory, see
EsKRIDGE, supra note 4, at 55-57; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory
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Generally, then,· we expect a practical reasoning approach to
statutory interpretation to consider the same range of concerns re
lied upon by more traditional approaches, but we also expect such
an approach to prioritize less formally or to weigh dispositively any
one factor. Thus, plain meaning of a text remains a primary consid
eration that frequently will end the inquiry absent strong contradic
tion from other sources. Evidence of drafter's intent, as well as a
more general assessment of a statute's purpose, often exert a strong
pull if they contradict plain meaning. So does concern with "hori
zontal coherence" of the statute with other, related provisions in
either the same act or other laws regulating the same topic or
conduct.
More abstract considerations include evolution of the statute in
light of changed circumstances over time, and the consistency of an
outcome with public values - widely held social norms that arise
from, or are embodied in, sources of law such as the Constitution,
statutes, regulations, or case law.59 Additionally, interpreters might
consider their own institutional role, both perceived authority and
limits to it - for example, "courts must apply the legislature's law,
so we give compelling weight to legislative intent" - and their role
vis-a-vis other players, such as the legislature and executive offi
cials.60 These more abstract concerns are likely to change an appli
cation only if their conflict with more concrete factors - plain
meaning, drafter's . intent - is especially compelling.61 Practical
meaning interpretation, then, will consider arguments based on a
variety of concerns that inform statutory meaning, weighing each in
light of the others.62

Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. RE.v. 1479, 1481 (1987) (arguing for a statutory interpretation

approach that takes into account public values and the current needs of society).

59. See Eskridge, supra note 13 (discussing public values in Supreme Court statutory
interpretation).
60. See EsKRIDGE, supra note 4, at 74-80.
61. An example of such an interpretation by the U.S. Supreme Court, much analyzed in
the dynamic�interpretation literature, is the Court's decision in Bob Jones University v.
United States, 461 U.S. 574 {1983). See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 40, at 343-48. Bob
Jones was a private, Christian university with racially discriminatory policies. Tue IRS de
nied it a tax exemption for institutions "organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable . . . or educational purposes." 26 U.S.C. § 501{c)(3) {1982). Tue Supreme Court,
employing an expansively interpretivist approach to the statute, held that the university did
not qualify for the exemption even though it was an educational institution whose racial
policies were grounded in its religious commitments. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 604.
62. See generally EsKRIPGE, supra note 4, at 48-74.
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Practical Reasoning as a Descriptive ·Theory of
Jury Decisionmaking

Practical reasoning should be an appealing model to test against
evidence concerning how juries apply statutes.

Jurors are not

trained in rules and procedures and thus would seem unlikely to
pursue a formal, deductive method. Case law references to the jury
in forming its judgments with a community's collective conscience
and perspective imply a practical-reasoning model.63 Further, prac
tical reasoning relies in part on the notion of an interpretive com
munity,

and

juries

are

groups

designed

to

represent

local

communities and to bring local norms and "common sense" to bear
on legal judgments.64 Juries learn through the trial much detail
about the factual context of their cases, and we would expect con
textual considerations to affect their decisions. Practical reasoning
accepts context as a significant consideration. Finally, for criminal
juries in particular, practical reasoning suggests a realistic means of
applying rules to achieve individual judgments of moral culpability,
which more literal, acontextual application would undermine.

In the analysis below, we will see that criminal juries explicitly
consider a range of the factors weighed in practical reasoning ap
proaches to interpretation - plain meaning, statutory purpose, so
cial norms, institutional role - often with an eye consciously
turned toward the normative justice of the culpability assessment.

In short, practical reasoning describes criminal jury decisionmaking
roughly as well as it does judicial decisions, and thus it provides a
normatively attractive perspective for understanding jury practices
that are now subjected to criticism as insufficiently literal in con
struction or deductive in method.65
63. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S.
404, 409-10 (1972); Willi ams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970); see also Darryl K. Brown,
The Role ofRace in Jury Impartiality and Venue Transfers, 53 MD. L. REv. 107, 140-47 (1994)
(describing jury decisionmaking in pragmatist and hermeneutic terms).
64. On the purpose of representative juries, see Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530 (asserting that the
jury brings the community's "coinmonsense judgment"); Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 410 (same);
Williams, 399 U.S. at 100 (same). Cf. EsKRIDGE, supra note 4, at 71-74 (discussing the role of
"communities of interpretation" in statutory application).
65. Pragmatic jury decisionmaking poses the same countermajoritarian difficulty faeed by
judges in acts of judicial review and statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation, and
constitutional review, is legitimate only if it is objective, foundational, and nonpolitical;
otherwise, unelected judges - and juries - are usurping political power from democratic
branches. Any substantive, nonmechanical decisionmaking by juries challenges the legisla
ture that drafted the statute and the democratically accountable prosecutor w�o initiated the
charge. Yet judicial review is justified as a check on the tyranny of the majority and execu
tive discretion exercised against citizens. The arguments for statutory interpretation are 'simi
lar and, at this point, familiar: not only is policymaking inevitable in applying statutes, it is
needed to assess the fit between the general rule and the specific case and to review the
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To begin exploring the descriptive power of practical reason in
jury decisionmaking, first I review existing empirical research on
jury decisionmaking and, to a lesser extent, research on other lay
approaches to legal reasoning. This literature partially documents
jurors' use of interpretive strategies and substantive considerations
of the sort described in practical-reasoning theories of judicial con
struction of statutes. It also provides insights and analytical tools
for the subsequent Part, in which I explore jury deliberations in two
cases for evidence of interpretive approaches.

ill.

SOCIAL SCIENCE REsEARCH ON

A.

1.

JURY

DECISIONMAKING

Cognitive Models of Jury Decisionmaking

Use of Stories in Factfinding and Decisionmaking

A large body of social science literature addresses a wide range
of issues related to jury decisionmaking.66 An important contribu
tion for present purposes is the cognitive psychological model of
jury decisionmaking developed over the last two decades, of which
Pennington and Hastie's story model is the best known and most
elaborate.67 The story model, which focuses more on factfinding
than law application, "identifies three processing substages: evi
dence evaluation; learning the verdict choice set; and an evidence
verdict match process."68 During the factfinding process, jurors se
lectively evaluate evidence and create intuitively coherent narrative
structures, or stories, that allow them to make sense of evidence.
Once given the law and verdict categories by the judge, jurors seek
the best match between the story representations of the evidence
and their memories of verdict categories. If it finds a "subjectively
satisfactory" match, the jury renders a verdict.69
The story model suggests that, during the factfinding process,
jurors

impose

on the trial information - both relevant evidence

and other available facts and social data - a narrative story organiprosecutor's judgment about that fit. See RAWLS, supra note 38, at 25-50; Farber & Frickey,
supra note 57, at 1616-17 (noting that, in the context of First Amendment doctrine, founda
tionalist theories result in problematic applications to particular cases).

66. Much of this research is related to factfinding issues that are not relevant here issues such as how credible jurors find eyewitness identifications, or how race, class, and
gender differences affect assessments of credibility and other factfinding tasks.
67. See REID liAsTIE ET AL., lNsIDE TiiE JURY {1983); Hastie supra note 8. Hastie, in a
summary of current behavioral science models of jury decisionmaking, identifies three for
mal, mathematical models in addition to his own cognitive model. None of these approaches
directly addresses issues of legal interpretation by juries.
68. Hastie, supra note 8,
69. See id.

at

26.
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zation. That story is shaped by their knowledge of similar events for example, knowledge of similar crimes, or similar patterns of
human behavior - and by generic expectations about necessary
story elements - for example, human motivations. This imposition
of narrative is "an active, constructive comprehension process in
which evidence is organized, elaborated, and interpreted."70
Pennington and Hastie further claim that the constructed story de

termines

the jury's decision, and "differences in story construction

[and final decisions] must arise from differences in world knowl

edge, that is, differences in experiences and beliefs about the social

world."71

Other researchers have reached similar conclusions using differ

ent research methods.72 Bennett and Feldman, drawing from their
ethnographic studies of real jury trials, emphasize that jurors neces
sarily situate evidence-based stories within a preexisting social con
text that includes criteria for a coherent, plausible story of human
conduct.73 "In the process of taking incidents from one social con
text and placing them in another, the [juror] selects data, specifies
the historical frame, redefines situational factors, and suggests miss
ing observations. In short, he or she can re-present an episode in a
version that conforms with his or her perspective . . . . "74 This study
also stresses that "background understandings" and "background
knowledge" inevitability serve as the source for inferences jurors
must make to interpret and reach judgments about social action.75
Their findings describe a contextual approach to reasoning that sit
uates factfinding within preexisting assumptions about human con
duct. They find as well that jurors have a fairly consistent goal of
reaching decisions consonant with notions of justice.76 This im
pulse, we might predict, could lead jurors to explore nonliteral stat
utory applications.
70. Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, The Story Model for Juror Decision Making, in
INSIDE TiiE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING, supra note 8, at 194.
71.

Id. at 196.

72. Ha stie and his col leagues used an experimental mo del of mo ck juries and simulated
trials. See id. at 204-13.
73. See BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 52, at 11. With a somewhat different goal of
describing how criminal juries make social judgments and justice conclusions - concerns
likely to affect statutory interpretation as wel l - their work also resulted in a model of story
construction to describe the pro cess of factfinding and legal judgment.
74.

Id. at 65 (endnote omitted).

75.

See id. at 50.

76. See id. at 8 (asserting that jurors must process large amounts of "informatio n in spe
cial ways that conform to the norms of justice and the legal requirements of cases").
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The important point to draw from these studies is their similar
ity to the hermeneutic and practical reasoning descriptions of judi
cial interpretation. Jurors incorporate considerations from their
experience to situate and give meaning to the data they receive in
the trial. While jurors' background perspectives influence decision
making, the narratives they impose on evidence are not purely indi
vidual or idiosyncratic. Consistent with pragmatist and
hermeneutic premises, the narrative structures that individuals have
available to organize factual information are those that are shared
within a community.77 Background assumptions about social life
and human conduct provide the basis to connect evidence to factual
inferences and conclusions.78
To understand and make use of legal instructions, jurors face a
difficult task of converting the instructions to legal "categories"
with a list of features that must be applied to the (constructed) fac
tual story.79 Though underdeveloped in the story model, statutory
interpretation fits in this stage and entails "reflection on the mean
ing of the verdict categories."80 Similarly, use of stories by jurors,
argue Bennett and Feldman, "provide[s] the most obvious link be
tween everyday analytical and communicational skills and the re
quirements of formal adjudication procedures," including "how
jurors apply legal statutes."81 The jurors' reasoning process resem
bles the inductive assessment of multiple concerns found in practi
cal reasoning. Interestingly, it is also reminiscent of Llewellyn's
description of the judges' decisionmaking. Through their "situation
sense," judges assess facts with reference to "a significant life
problem-situation into which they comfortably fit."82 Having typi
fied a case and identified key, relevant components, they "let the
particular equities begin to register" in light of common sense, ap77. See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, Anti-Foundationalism, Theory, Hope, and the Teaching of
Composition, in DOING WHAT CoMES NATURALLY 342, 344-45 (1989).
78. See ALBERT J. MooRE ET AL., TRIAL ADvoCACY: INFERENCES, .ARGUMENTS, AND
TECHNIQUES (1996) (emphasizing attention to background sources for factual inferences); see
also JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 22-24 (1949) (arguing that facts are not found but
are processed through a series of "refractions"); Moore, supra note 7, at 275-83 (arguing that
jurors process information using schemas drawn from their own social experiences).
79. See Pennington & Hastie, supra note 70, at 199-200. Pennington and Hastie suggest
that
the classification of a story into an appropriate verdict category is likely to be a deliber
ate process. . . . (A] juror may have to reason about whether a circumstance in the story
such as "pinned against a wall" constitutes a good match to a required circumstance,
"unable to escape," for a verdict of not guilty by reason of self-defense.
Id. at 200.
80. Id. at 203.
81. BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 52, at 10.
82. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 38, at 222.
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preciation for society's needs, "feel for an appropriate rule," and
respect for precedent.83 Both understandings give a central role to
nondeductive reasoning and judgments arising from the deci
sionmaker's background experience.

2. Interpretive Construction of Facts in Criminal Law
Neither set of studies gives much attention to the interpretation
of legal rules, or how application of those rules affects either story
construction or final decisions.84 Still, the studies provide at least
two suggestive insights. The first we have noted: jurors employ a
situated, context-sensitive approach to factfinding and decision
making that corroborates hermeneutic and pragmatic perspec
tives.85 Jurors interpret the meaning of facts with reference to a
broader social context. At the same time that they construct factual
meaning in a reciprocal relation with their preunderstandings about
the social world,86 they also determine the meaning of statutory
terms conveyed by instructions and verdict choices, a process that
further influences factual construction.87
Second, such descriptions of factual interpretation should re
mind us of a well-identified interpretive difficulty in criminal law.
Mark Kelman has noted that "[l]egal argument can be made only

after

a fact pattern is characterized by interpretive constructs,"
which he suggests typically make "a single legal result seem[ ] inevi-

83. See id. at 221-22; see also LLEWELLYN, COMMON LAW, supra note 38, at 268-85 (dis
cussing the idea of "situation sense").
. 84. As in other social science studies of juries, the working assumption appears to be that
legal rules are formal and fixed, their application unproblematic. Bennett and Feldman, for
example, describe the jury's task as "constructing an interpretation for the defendant's al
leged activities and determining how that interpretation fits into the set of legal criteria that
must be applied." BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 52, at 8. Stories that jurors construct
from evidence "produce interpretations that can be categorized easily within the legal stat
utes that apply to a case." Id. at 10; see also id. (asserting that stories reduce "complex bodies
of evidence" to "terms that correspond nicely to legal categories").

85. See, e.g., id. at 64-65. Bennett and Feldman describe a process of fact interpretation,
in fact, that closely matches the hermeneutic-circle strategy described by Gadamer of contin
ued reexamination from varying perspectives in order to reevaluate the whole and its various
parts. See supra note 52. They describe jurors as "building an interpretation by working
back and forth" among various cognitive operations and "testing the result against the other
side's story . . . taking incidents from one social context and placing them in another."
BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 52, at 64-65; cf. Zeppos, supra note 4, at 1338 ("Fact find
ing is no less of an interpretive act than statutory interpretation.").
86. See, GADAMER, supra note 34, at 226-71, 291-96; see also supra section II.A (discussing
practical-reasoning literature).
87. See, e.g., Roberts et al., supra note 8, at 262-63 (discussing the possibility that different
verdict options "might directly influence the process of evaluation and 'construal' of informa
tion from cases" and citing studies suggesting such influence).
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table."88 Kelman argues that interpretive constructs in criminal law
occur in four forms, all of which operate unconsciously or "non
rationally" to shape our view of the defendant's behavior.89 One
construct involves the choice of broadly or narrowly constructing
the relevant time frame. This decision whether to consider events
that happen either before or after the criminal incident depends on
whether the events seem relevant to judging the defendant's behav
ior.90 Similarly, even when employing a broader time frame, one
may choose to take a disjointed or unified view of a defendant's
choices during that time, allowing earlier events or states of mind to
become more or less relevant.91 One may comparably choose to
.construe the defendant's intent narrowly - relating solely to physi
cal actions at the moment of the alleged crime - or more broadly
to include his goals and the criminal nature of his conduct.92 Fi
nally, criminal law must choose whether to view the defendant nar
rowly - as a unique individual with a specific set of perceptions
and capabilities - or more broadly as a person of normal capacities
88. Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN, L.
REv. 591, 593 (1981) .
89. See id.
90. See id. at 593-94.
91. Kelman offers this illustration:
The earlier "moment" may be the time at which a defendant made some judgment about
the situation she was in, some judgment that at least contributed to the ultimate decision
to act criminally. For instance, the defendant negligently believes she must use deadly
force to defend herself and then she intentionally kills someone, having formed that
belief. . . .
Once we agree to look at these earlier moments, we must decide whether to disjoin
or unify the earlier moment with the later moment. We can treat all the relevant facts as "
constituting a single, incident, or we can disjoin the e vents into two separate incidents.
. . . Is a negligent decision to kill followed b y an intentional killing a negligent or
intentional act?
Id. at 595; see also id. at 616-20 (discussing further disjointed versus unified accounts).
For e xamples of deliberations in which jurors discussed time-frame issues - specifically,
how much of defendant's prior life experience was relevant to his insanity defense - see
RITA JAMES SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 140-41 (1967) (" [L]ike the
jurors in the incest case, these jurors [in a housebreaking case] also stressed the defendant's
behavior at the time of the crime rather than his childhood or other e vents in his past.
In
both trials the jurors focused on the defendant's behavior immediately preceding and follow
ing the crime."). See also id. at 142-43 (discussing jurors' review of evidence beyond the
moment of the crime).
92. See Kelman, supra note 88, at 595-96, 620-33. As one of several illustrations of this
construct, Kelman points to cases of impossible attempts. For example, in People v. Jaffe, 78
N.E. 169 (N.Y. 1906) , the defendant was acquitted of attempting to receive stolen property
because the goods that he expected to receive had been recovered by the police. One can
view Jaffe as broadly intending to receive stolen property, if the facts had been as he assumed
them to be. Viewed more narrowly, Jaffe intended only to receive these specific goods, which
in fact were no longer "stolen goods"; thus, his intent was merely to receive specific non
stolen items. See Kelman, supra note 88, at 621-22.
• • •
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to whom widely held assumptions about human tr.aits and abilities
apply.93
In the analysis of jury deliberations below, we see that jurors
make just these sorts of decisions about interpretive constructions.
We will also see, as Kelman argued - with reference to judges and
commentators rather than juries - how these factual constructions
also help jurors make legal decisions.94 Implicit in both the social
science story model and Kelman's analysis of interpretive con
structs is a series of normative baselines about what facts are rele
vant to an understanding of the events described at trial.95 Those
baselines are largely implicit in what seems commonsensical and
plausible - the sorts of social assumptions we expect jurors to
bring to the factfinding task, and the sort that Kelman describes as
unconscious or nonrational. Jurors construct such factual interpre
tations for a purpose, which is to assess culpability in light of crimi
nal statutes. Factual interpretation and statutory interpretation,
then, likely have an interactive or reciprocal relationship: a factual
story will make a particular application of a statute seem obvious,
appropriate, or most plausible. Conversely, statutory language that
seems to compel one result in light of an initial factual understand
ing may prompt a jury to reconsider its construction of facts if that
initial result is discomforting
if it conflicts with a "considered
-

judgment" about the proper moral assessment of the defendant's
action.
93. See Kelman, supra note 88, at 596, 633-42. The law must make this choice, for exam
ple, in evaluating a provocation defense to a homicide case, for which the defendant's lethal
response must be reasonable. No reasonable person would kill another when provoked by a
victfui's conduct that is not lethally threatening itself, such as a spouse's act of adultery. On
the other hand, someone just like the defendant, with his temperament, perceptions, and
patterns of judgment, would kill, because this defendant did. See id. at 636-37. Courts have
negotiated this unresolvable question of how particularized to make the reasonable-person
standard - that is, how many of the defendant's traits and circumstances to include in the
model - with a wide variety of answers. See generally Richard G. Singer, The Resurgence of
Mens Rea: II - Honest but Unreasonable Mistake of Fact in Self Defense, 28 B.C. L. REv.
459 (1987). For a discussion of jury deliberations that address this issue, see SIMON, supra
note 91, at 161 (concluding that most jurors in the study "seemed to feel that the ability to
distinguish between right and wrong should have been internalized as part of one's basic
personality" and thus held the defendant to that expectation).
94. See Irwin A. Horowitz, The Effect of Jury Nullification Instruction on Verdicts and
Jury Functioning in Criminal Trials, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 25 (1985) [hereinafter Horowitz,
Effect] (suggesting that instructions can affect the fact discussions in deliberations and that
the factual story jurors compose is contingent on the law to be applied to it); Irwin A.
Horowitz, Jury Nullification: The Impact ofInstructions, Arguments and Challenges on Jury
Decision Making, 12 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 439 (1988) [hereinafter Horowitz, Impact].
95. Cf. Jack M. Beermann & Joseph William Singer, Baseline Questions in Legal Reason
ing: The Example of Property in Jobs, 23 GA. L. REv. 911 (1989) (examining the often
unacknowledged substantive premises necessary for legal reasoning); Cass R. Sunstein,
Lochner's Legacy, 87 CoLUM. L. REv. 873, 902-17 (1987) (same).
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Studies of the Effects of Attitudes, Ideologies, Values, and
Sentiments on Jury Verdicts
1.

Attitudes and Ideology

In light of the effect of perspectives and social context on
factfinding and judgment processes, there has been considerable
empirical study of "extralegal" influences on jury decisionmaking,
ranging from demographic factors - race, gender, age, economic
status - to social attitudes and political ideology. Many such fac
tors affect, to varying degrees, which facts jurors remember or em
phasize

and which final judgments

seem

more plausible

or

preferable. While such considerations are the stock-in-trade of trial
lawyers' jury-selection strategies, many 0correlate so weakly with
verdict choices

that

they

are ineffective predictors

of juror

behavior.96
Case-relevant attitudes or ideological commitments probably af
fect decisions most strongly. Ellsworth found in one study, for ex
ample, that attitudes toward capital punishment, which correlate
with a collection of views about crime and the criminal justice sys
tem generally, subtly affect a range of small decisions that go into
criminal-verdict choices.97 Such attitudes affect perceptions of the
plausibility of witnesses, the availability of alternative cognitive
"scripts" or stories for making sense of the evidence, the possibility
of mistaken conviction, and the individual sense of how much doubt
constitutes reasonable doubt.98 Another study found that, in a civil
action for damages against police officers who conducted an illegal
search, awards were affected by juror knowledge of the search's
outcome - whether it yielded illegal drugs - by the seriousness of
the offense, and, in some cases, by jurors' political attitudes or ide
ology.99 Such information and ideology seemed to affect verdicts
96. See Christy A. VISher, Juror Decision Making: The Importance of Evidence, 11 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 1, 3 (1987) (summarizing research literature).
97. See Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Some Steps Between Attitudes and Verdicts, in INSIDE THE
JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING, supra note 8, at 42; cf. Levine,
supra note 9, at 616-21, 633-34 (finding, in an empirical study, that jury verdicts vary with
public-opinion trends on legal norms and statute purposes).
98. See Ellsworth, supra note 97, at 58.
99. See Jonathan D. Casper & Kennette M. Benedict, The Influence ofOutcome Informa
tion and Attitudes on Juror Decision Making in Search and Seizure Cases, in INSIDE urn
JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING, supra note 8, at 65 (finding infor
mational and attitudinal influences on jurors' factfinding and story-constructing processes).
With regard to assessments of a search's legality, judges are also concerned with outcome
information. See William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L.
REv. 881 (1991) (describing the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement as serving to pre
vent judicial bias from search-outcome information available in a postsearch suppression
hearing).
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by indirectly influencing the construction of a knowledge structure
to interpret and summarize evidence of the case . 100
Two points about these :findings are important here. First, atti
tudes, though apparently stronger than demographic distinctions,
have proven generally ineffective as predictors of final decisions be
cause other factors - including evidence and trial procedures suppress their controlling effects.1°1 Several studies confirm that
when evidence is relatively strong, the influence on juries of legally
irrelevant facts as well as moderate disagreements with substantive
rules is minimal.102 The effect of such factors increases in close
cases, but the variation in outcomes does not substantially differ

from those' the justice system produces without the jury.103

More important, attitudinal and ideological biases are hardly
limited to jurors, which diminishes their relevance for a specifically
jury-focused theory of interpretation. An extensive and growing
political-science literature examines attitudinal influences on judi
cial decisionmaking, particularly in Supreme Court opinions.104
Like attitudinal studies of juries, research on judicial ideology sug
gests that judges' political and social attitudes substantially affect
decisionmaking. One implication is that comparable :findings about
juries are unexceptional. Together, the research simply suggests
that any human decisionmaker is significantly affected by ideologi
cal predispositions that legal training cannot suppress.105
100. See Casper

& Benedict, supra note 99, at 65-82.
JoHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 57-58 (1988) (citing sources).
102. See, e.g., Martha A. Myers, Rule Departures and Making Law: Juries and Their Ver
dicts, ):3 L. & SoCY. REv. 781, 794-95 (1979).
io3. See, e.g., DONALD BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR oi: LAW (1976) (arguing from empirical
evidence that legal outcomes consistently vary across forums and legal institutions with such
legally irrelevant, social factors as the wealth or social status of parties); DONALD BLACK,
SOCIOLOGICAL JUSTICE (1989) (same).
104. See, e.g., ROBERT A. CARP & C.K. ROWLAND, POLICYMAKING AND PoLmcs IN THE
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS {1983) (arguing from empirical data that judicial attitudes 101. See

personal values and backgrounds as well as regional customs - affect decisions, particularly
in close cases); SHELDON GOLDMAN & THOMAS P. J�GE, THE FEDERAL CoURTS AS A
PoLmCAL SYSTEM 134-84 {3d ed. 1985); GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MINo REvrs
ITED: PSYCHOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF SUPREME CoURT IDEOLOGY {1974) {describing an atti
tudinal theory of Supreme Court decisionmaking); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH,
THE SUPREME CoURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL {1993); Harold J. Spaeth, The Attitudi
nal Mode� in CoNTEMPLATING CoURTS 296 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995); see also GERALD N.
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 88-91
(1991) (recounting blatant judicial bias in legal interpretation on civil rights issues); id. at 33235 (describing lower courts' resistance to criminal procedure mandates that conflict with local
practices).
105. More significant, attitudinal descriptions in large part may collapse into legal
reasoning descriptions of decisionmaking. If most theories of statutory interpretation - and
constitutional review - acknowledge substantive discretion of decisionmakers and accept a
legitimate role for public values or political morality, it becomes difficult to distinguish be-
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Public Values and Justice Sentiments106

Several studies have examined a topic closely related to ideolog
ical influences - the effects of jurors' notions of justice related to
specific, factual scenarios. Finkel tested whether popular attitudes
regarding the felony-murder rule107 and accessory liability affected
verdicts when jurors had to apply those two rules in a death-penalty
prosecution.108 Two points from the study are especially interesting
here. First, Fmkel identifies a widely held value - proportionality
- through which jurors apparently mediate the application of
law.109 Second, he identifies instruction language that changes
many verdicts but does not fully control them in the sense of pro
ducing outcomes we would expect from uniform, literal application
of legal rules.110 Thus, the study identifies jurors struggling be
tween strong, widely held norms and conflicting criminal law rules,
a struggle mediated by interpretation of instructions. It seems some
jurors resolve that tension by applying statutes literally and against
personal or community preferences; others resolve it against literal
application, by either ignoring the instruction or dynamically inter
preting it. The effort to define the effect, if any, of social norms on
tween illegitimate biases and legitimate incorporation of public norms, theories of govern
ment, or well-argued policy choices.

106. I do not mean to imply, by the separate headings for this section and the preceding
one, a sharp conceptual distinction between ideology or attitudes and public values or justice
notions. I separate them only to follow the distinctions in the studies I discuss here and to
suggest, for present purposes, a narrow definition of ideology that links it closely with
mainstream political positions, while suggesting, with the terms "values" and "justice",
notions that are less consciously political and more instinctual dispositions. The distinction is
not one that can withstand much scrutiny.
107. The felony-murder rule holds a defendant guilty of murder if an unlawful killing
occurs during the course of a felony, whether or not the killing was intentional. See JosHUA
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CruMJNAL LAW § 31.06, at 479 (1995).
108. See FINKEL, supra note 9, at 159-71; Norman J. Fmkel & Kevin B. Duff, Felony
Murder and Community Sentiment: Testing the Supreme Court's Assertions, 15 LAW & HuM.
BEHAV. 405 (1991); Norman J. Fmkel & Stefanie F. Smith, Principals and Accessories in
Capital Felony-Murder: The Proportionality Principle Reigns Supreme, 27 L. & Socv. RBv.
129 (1993).

109. Jurors apparently felt strongly that just outcomes required treating accomplices less
severely than principal perpetrators in felony-murder scenarios, although criminal law dic
tates equal liability for them. See FINKEL, supra note 9, at 169-71 (discussing findings of
proportionality sentiment).
110. Jurors given a "conclusive presumption" instruction convicted defendants of felony
murder more frequently than those who received no such instruction or those who received a
"nullification" instruction, which informed them they had the "final authority to decide
whether or not to apply a given law," to which they need only give "respectful attention."
See Fmkel & Smith, supra note 108, at 148 (reprinting instructions); id. at 153-54 (discussing
experiment results). For a discussion of similar studies on the effects of instructions, see infra
notes 160-81 and accompanying text.
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rule-application decisions should remind us of judicial public-values
analysis.111
In their seminal study of juries, Kalven and Zeisel relied on
judges' assessments about juror reasoning to explain verdicts that
disagreed with decisions judges would have rendered in the same
case.112 Based on these judicial assessments, Kalven and Zeisel
identified several sentiments that seemed to explain some ver
dicts.113 In one pattern of verdicts in assault and homicide cases,
jurors seemed to construe self-defense rules liberally to expand
concepts of adequate provocation. Jurors seemed to excuse some
proportional violent responses to insults or other belligerent, pro
vocative, or condemnable victim behavior, such as police brutality
against a defendant charged with assault, or the record of abuse by

a husband who was shot by his wife.114 The authors concluded that
the jury's "view is not so much that the defendant was blameless,
but that in light of the provocation by the victim, the defendant's
punishment should be moderated."115 They found "the jury's re

sponses to provocation and harassment are based on a delicate

calculus"116 and demonstrate "the moderation of the jury's revolt
against the law."117
Drawing the comparison to Finkel's :findings, we can describe
Kalven and Zeisel's jurors as demonstrating another aspect of the
proportionality value. The concern here is proportional allocation
111. See supra notes 16, 59-60, and accompanying text.
112. Kalven and Zeisel asked judges whether they would have rendered the same deci
sion as the jury and then - in the minority of cases in which judge and jury disagreed asked judges' opinions about why the jury arrived at its verdict. See KALVEN & ZEISEL,
supra note 14, at 45. The study concluded generally that jurors competently evaluate non
technical evidence and do not allow extralegal concerns to change decisions in most cases.
See id. at 149-62. Yet it had several drawbacks for an exploration of jurors' interpretive
practice. The data is based entirely on judges' views and opinions, so we have little informa
tion directly from juries other than the verdict There is insufficient consideration of factors
other than juror sentiments, such as the quality of lawyering, that may have affected case
outcomes, and jury instructions are not recounted nor considered closely in the explanation
of verdicts. For related criticisms of the study, see Gu!NfHER, supra note 101, at xviii-x:xi.
113. Some appeared to be simply incidents of bias that would be difficult to fit into any
normatively defensible theory of adjudication. Sympathy or dislike for defendants, for exam
ple, seemed to affect a small percentage of those cases in which the judge and jury disagreed.
See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 14, at 214-18; HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 9, at 135
(noting that Kalven and Zeisel found sympathy to be a factor in only four percent of trials).
Subsequent research, however, has not consistently found significant sympathy effects. See
HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 9, at 134; Francis C. Dane & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Effects
of Defendants' and Victims' Characteristics on Jurors' Verdicts, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE
CoURTROOM 83 (Norbert L. Kerr & Robert M. Bray eds., 1982).
114. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 14, at 221-41.
115. Id. at 240.
116. Id. at 231.
117. Id. at 229.
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of blame between defendant and victim, rather than between multi

ple defendants. In these cases as well, jurors appear to aim for a

morally nuanced verdict - often by rendering a verdict for a lesser

included offense· as a compromise between acquittal and literal ap
plication of the principal statute - that takes account of the vic
tim's contributory fault or assumption of risk.11s
Moreoyer, the use of such a proportionality value can be under
stood as an interpretive device to achieve the individualized assess
ment of culpability that is the underlying purpose of criminal
adjudication. A crucial tool for judging a defendant's conduct is to
compare it not only to what we expect from ourselves and others in
that situation, but also - at least implicitly, and perhaps even un
consciously - to what others do in situations the criminal law iden
tifies as related. Criminal law categorizes together as intentional
homicides, for example, both the act of euthanasia committed by a
nurse upon a consenting, terminally ill patient and a paradigmatic
robbery-murder of a stranger. We should expect some difference in

judgments of the degree of moral culpability between such dispa
rate cases, even under the same legal rule, and expect that rule in
terpretation will b e informed by such strong background
understandings as the proportionality sentiment.119 That effect may
not differ in kind from judges' use of background norms when en
gaged in statutory interpretation as well as constitutional review.120
Just as, under a dynamic or practical-reasoning analysis of judi
cial interpretation, statutes are less likely to be applied according to

their common-sense meaning when other considerations point to
ward alternate readings, strong conflicts between plain meaning
and widely held popular notions of fairness relating to criminal

judgments are likely sources for dynamic interpretation of instruc
tions by juries. Robinson and Darley recently have documented

several contexts in which popular notions about what legal rules are
or should be depart from common law rules or contemporary crimi
nal codes.121 They found, for example, that most of their survey
118. See id. at 242-57. Victims who were reckless or intoxicated, for example, often
moved juries to acquit a defendant or convict him of a lesser charge. See id. at 254-57.
119. Cf. Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 29, at 309, 313-14 (assessing the moral quality of
each defendant's motivating emotions to distinguish between two defendants who killed with
a claim of provocation).
120. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 4, at 56-62 (discussing the use of norms in statutory
interpretation); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term - Foreward: The Forms of
Justice, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1979) (discussing the use of public values in constitutional
review).
121. See PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JusnCE, LIABILITY AND BLAME:
CoMMUNITY Vll}WS AND THE CruMINAL LAw 13-51 (1995).

March 1998]

Jury Interpretation

1227

respondents - like Finkel's mock jurors - would assign less liabil
ity to accomplices than principal perpetrators, in contrast to most
criminal codes.122 Across a range of criminal law issues, including
the role of harm and renunciation in attempts and failures to res
cue,123 they found that subjects - just as Kalven and Zeisel de
tected among real jurors - make "more nuanced distinctions
between similar but not identical cases" than criminal codes do.124
The tension between popular notions and rules could be good news

if popular distinctions are made for defensible reasons. It shows
that individualized assessments of moral culpability, sensitive to cir
cumstances and background norms, are not only a theoretical goal
of criminal law; they are also part of the popular understanding of
criminal law's purpose.
The results of Robinson and Darley's study do not mean people
vote for personal outcome preferences when they become jurors.125
Assigned the role of juror, one may feel a stronger obligation to
ignore personal sentiments and apply the legal rules conveyed
through instructions fairly literally.126 On the other hand, perhaps
122. See id. at 41-42. For a similar finding in a mock-juror study, see FINKEL, supra note
9, at 154-71.
123. Robinson and Darley's subjects gave weight to whether harm occurred, thus punish
ing criminal attempts less severely than completed offenses and allowing a renunciation de•
fense for attempts that were nearly complete and for which most codes ·allow no such
defense. They also detected clear community sentiment for a rule requiring a higher thresh
old for attempt liability than the prevailing rule - that is, the actor must be in "dangerous
proximity" of completing the crime rather than merely taking a "substantial step" toward
completion. Additionally, subjects supported liability for failing to rescue others in distress,
though most codes impose no such liability. See ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 121, at 1351.
124. See id. at 50. Al> part of that inclination toward fine-tuned judgments, respondents
also supported grading of offenses on a long continuum that distinguishes between offenses
even more finely than the eight or nine grades of offenses now typical in most codes. See id.
at 198.
125. The purpose of Robinson and Darley's study primarily was to identify popular con
sensus about the appropriate content of legal rules, which rule drafters could use to inform
their revision of rules. See id. at 215.
126. We see strong evidence of this feeling in the Harris juries, discussed infra at section
N.B. For discussion of evidence that jurors feel constraints to their authority and discretion
when serving as jurors, see, e.g., GUINTHE R, supra note 101, at SS; liANs & VIDMAR, supra
note 9, at 154-57 (reviewing research, concluding that "[d]epartures [from instructions] oc
curred predominantly in those cases where the evidence itself was ambiguous or contradic
tory," and quoting one juror who felt compelled to follow instructions against her personal
preferences and who noted that " 'the way the judge charged us, we had no choice,' that
'personal views don't count,' and that she 'was in full agreement with the defendants until we
were charged by the judge' " (quoting JESSICA M:rrFoRD, THE TRIAL OF DocroR SPOCK
(1969))); SIMON, supra note 91, at 163-70; Robert W. Balch et al., Socialization of Jurors:
Voir Dire as a Right of Passage, 4 J. CRIM. JuST. 271 (1976); Diane L. Bridgeman & David
Marlowe, Jury Decision Making: An Empirical Study Based on Actual Felony Trials, 64 J.
APPLIED PsYCHOL. 91, 98 (1979), reprinted in JURIES: FORMATION AND BEHAVIOR, supra
note 7, at 91, 98.
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instructions conflict so strongly with notions of just outcomes that
jurors

allow popular sentiments to lead them to implausible in
terpretations of statutes.127 Two points remain for exploration: evi

do

dence of legal-reasoning approaches employed by nonlawyers in
the justice system, and the effect that instructions have on jury
decisions.
C.

Lay Approaches to Legal Reasoning

Studies of how people without legal training behave in courts as
parties, advocates, and judges suggest insights on how jurors may
construe and apply legal rules. John Conley and William O'Barr
studied lay litigants in small-claims courts, where some judges are
also nonlawyers.128 Their extensive, qualitative study of litigants
and judges' discourse in the litigation context revealed several in
teresting features of lay ideas, strategies, and thought processes
about laW. Conley and O'Barr divided litigants descriptively into

two broad groups along a "rules-relationships continuum."129 Liti
gants nearer the relational end of the continuum understand and
describe their disputes in terms of social relationships and mutual
obligations; their accounts downplay individual autonomy and con
trol over events and emphasize the context and social networks in
which disputes arise. They seek to resolve disputes with reference
to contextualized social rules rather than literal application of legal

rules.13o "Rule-oriented" litigants, in contrast, take a more legalis
tic, contractual approach to dispute description and resolution that
more closely matches formal notions of legal process. They view
law as a set of clear rules that allocates responsibility regardless of
status and context; they view society as "a network not of relation
ships, but of contractual opportunities that each individual has the
power to accept or reject on a case-by-case basis."131
Despite the contrast between relational litigants' contextual ori
entation and the dominant view of law as a deductive process em
ploying sets of rules, relational litigants "are not illogical in the
sense of reacting to problems in an unstructured or random fashion.
Their reasoning is indeed systematic, but their logic is so different
127. See GUINTHER, supra note 101, at 58 (noting that, while "people don't forget their
prejudices just because they become jurors, events within the trial and deliberation processes
act as reductive factors," including "(t]he solemn oath that all jurors take to be impartial").
128. See JoHN M. CoNLEY & WILLIAM M. O'BARR, RuLES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS:
THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE (1990).
129. See id. at 58.
130. See id.
131. Id. at 59.
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from the law's as to be largely imperceptible to those in whom the
tradition of formal legal analysis is deeply ingrained. "132
Moreover, Conley and O'Barr found similar distinctions among
small-claims court judges.133 Some were lawyers, while others had
only brief training designed for small-claims court judges. Neither
sort of training suppressed variations in judges' views of rules or the
relevance of context, relationships, and norms.134 Three of the
study's judicial "types" are most relevant here.135 "Strict adherent"

judges "view[ ] the law as a set of inflexible neutral principles" and
their judicial role as "nondiscretionary application of the abstract
rules and principles that constitute the law."136 "Authoritative deci
sion makers" are similarly firm in their belief that they follow the
law, but they "emphasize their personal responsibility for deci
sions" and "give no indication that there is any source of legal au
thority beyond their personal opinions."137 In contrast, the "law
132. Id. at 60. This contextual approach is comparable to the story construction strategies
that jurors typically employ. See B ENNEIT & FELDMAN, supra note 52, at 49-61, 71-73 (iden
tifying "interpretive rules" that jurors use to construct a coherent story from evidence and
identify a central point for that story that builds on background knowledge and
understandings).
133. See

CoNLEY & O'BARR, supra note 128, at 85-112.

134. See id. at 111-12 ("[W]e have attempted to dismantle the stereotype of 'the judge' as
impassive arbiter. We have shown that informal court judges are highly variable in their
conceptions of law, their views of their role, and their approaches to problem solving. Much
of this variation can be explained in terms of the rules-relationships continuum we developed
in reference to litigants.").
135. The two other types of judges are the "mediators," who try to avoid ruling at all by
instead encouraging or nearly coercing settlements, see id. at 90-96, and the "proceduralists,"
who "place high priority on maintaining procedural regularity" and "rarely, if ever, interject
themselves personally into cases by seeking to mediate or encouraging extralegal com
promises," id. at 101.
136. Id. at 85.
137. Id. at 96. They also "often express critical opinions about the in- and out-of-court
behavior of the parties," id. at 96, entertaining the sort of considerations that, if made by
juries, would be cited as evidence of improper, extralegal reasoning. The authors cite a sam
ple passage of such reasoning and commentary by one judge. The plaintiffs had purchased a
used refrigerator with a warranty from the defendant. The refrigerator quickly broke, caus
ing food spoilage. The plaintiffs had the appliance repaired by another for $50 and sought a
refund for the refrigerator plus reimbursement for lost food. The judge explained his judg
ment of awarding the plaintiffs only the $50 repair fee as follows:
Okay, I'm not satisfied that . . . that is something that he should be responsible for at this
point. Um, you know I think he's got a right to try to come out and fix it and if some
thing there is wrong. But when something goes wrong and you lose the food, that's not,
I don't believe that's part of the guarantee. The guarantee is to come out and fix it.
Your refrigerator can go wrong. A new one can go bad. Um, I'm going to award you
the $50 right here. I think you did the right thing by, by giving him a chance and then
going on and getting somebody else to fix it . . . .
Id. at 97. The authors note that the judgment "contains no reference to a body of law that
guides . • . [the judge's] decision making," that the judge "responds in the first person . . .
thereby personalizing the dispute between the plaintiff and the court," and that he offers
"gratuitous, if favorable, assessments about the conduct of the plaintiff'' and thereby "steps
beyond the bounds of making a legal decision to evaluate and comment on the behavior of
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maker" is a judge. who "views the law not as a constraint, but as a
resource" and "renders judgments consistent with his or her sense
of fairness and justice."138 The variation in approaches to law thus
appears even among those with judicial experience and legal
training.139
In light of such evidence, we can expect that nonlawyers would
bring similar orientations toward the law with them when they
enter the jury room; th� jury deliberations examined in the next
Part confirm this expectation. Some jurors may be rule-oriented
and attempt to apply instructions in a quasi-formalist manner famil
iar to lawyers. Others, however, may attempt to employ rules in a
more contextualized assessment of the case and reach a verdict that
accords with shared notions of social obligations and responsibility
as well as or instead of applicable rules.140 The contextualized ap
proach of this latter group of jurors raises the concern about the
displacement of rules with personal notions of justice. Such jurors
- like authoritative judges - may deliberate with more personal
references to themselves and to litigants and cite more extralegal
considerations; some - like law-making judges - may strive to
reconcile rule application with strongly felt justice norms.
Traditional understandings of law application and of the jury's
proper role implicitly prefer rule-oriented thinkers and lead to mis
givings about relational jurors. The latter group, however, may in
fact be reasoning just as "legally" as rule-oriented jurors. Interpret
ing rules with a contextualized assessment of social relationships
and obligations is a normatively legitimate form of understanding
and applying law that judges have widely employed, and scholars
have endorsed, in recent years. The discussion of practical reasonthe litigants." Id. at 98. In other cases, such commentary revealed how the judge "believes
that the people who bring their troubles to his court ought to reform their lives." Id.; cf., e.g.,
VISher, supra note 96, at 3-4, 12-14 (discussing "extralegal" influences on jury
decisionmaking).

138. CoNLEY & O'BARR, supra note 128, at

87.

139. That should not be surprising. Legal scholars' long-running debates over proper
approaches to judicial review and statutory application demonstrate comparable variations.
See e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 40 (discussing and criticizing several prominent ap
proaches to statutory interpretation); Michael J. Perry, The Legitimacy of Particular Concep
tions of Constitutional Interpretation, 17 VA. L. REv. 669 (1991) (discussing various
approaches to judicial review); Zeppos, supra note 4 (discussing and criticizing approaches to
statutory interpretation).
140. It would be interesting to classify mock jurors in such studies as Fmkel's using a rule
oriented/relational distinction. See FINKEL, supra note 9, at 154-71; supra text accompanying
notes 129-31. It may well be that those jurors who declined to treat accomplices the same as
principals in the felony-murder scenario are disproportionately relational, contextual think
ers, while those who applied the statutes literally, perhaps despite conflicts with strong justice
sentiments, may be mostly rule-oriented.
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ing in public-law scholarship is one obvious example.141 But the
relational approach is familiar to private-law judges and scholars as
well.142 The trend in contract and tort law has been toward taking
account of the inevitable complexities in social relationships found
in business contracts and dealings and away from a narrower, inore
literal rule application that discounts context and social norms.143
We might view relational thinkers on juries as fitting within this judicial practice.144

·

We need to assess juror decisionmaking with an analysis more
complex than simply asking whether they literally apply statutes.
We need to compare jurors' approaches with actual judicial practice
in order to assess whether contextualized, relational approaches to
rule application are normatively appropriate within contemporary,
postformalist traditions of law interpretation.
D.

1.

A

Studies of Whether Jurors Follow Instructions on Law
Note about Jury Comprehension of Rules and Instructions

Social science research has demonstrated that jurors do not con
sistently apply jury instructions literally. One explanation for these
findings is that jurors simply do not understand the instructions.145
They may not remember rules or statutory elements they are given
through instructions, and they may misunderstand rules of which
they have some memory, particularly if they have strong preconcep141. See Eskridge, supra note 13, at 1017-18, 1063.
142. See JAy M. FEINMAN, ECONOMIC NEGLIGENCE §§ 7.1-.5 (1995) (tort law); IAN
MAcNEIL, THE NEw SoCIAL CoNTRAcr 10-35 (1980) (contract law).
143. See FEINMAN, supra note 142, §7.3.1-.3.2, at 192-95. As Feinman notes:

The fundamental policy orientation of the relational approach is that the intertwined
aspects of relationships carry with them responsibilities that persons in the relationships
owe to one another. People in relationships and relational networks are interconnected;
their interconnectedness means that they must attend to one another's interests at the
same time that they protect their own interest. These relational responsibilities often
should be enforced by legal rules.
Id. § 7.3.2, at 194.
144. We also may understand relational thinkers as employing in part a strong version of
Rawls's process of reflective equilibrium, in as much as they double-check rule application
with considered notions of just outcomes and employ a contextual analysis in attempts to
reconcile the two. See RAWLS, supra note 38, at 48-51.
145. See AMmAM ELWORK ET AL., MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE 3-24
(1982); HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 9, at 121-24; Paul H. Robinson, Are Criminal Codes
Irrelevant?, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 159, 170-75 (1994); Laurence J. Severance & Elizabeth F.
Loftus, Improving the Ability ofJurors to Comprehend and Apply Criminal Jury Instructions,
17 L. & SoCY. REv. 153 (1982).
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tions about the alleged crime.146 Such .findings seem to pose obvi
ous problems for acceptable jury interpretation of statutes.
Despite its seriousness, juror miscomprehension is a problem
largely separate from jury rule interpretation. This is because, first,
the methodology used in some studies likely exaggerates the
amount of miscomprehension, and, more important, the blame for
jurors' lack of understanding lies to a significant extent with courts
rather than juries.
On the first point, some of the studies that identify juror misun
derstanding of statutes survey jurors individually at some point af
ter they have been instructed and :find significant errors in retention
and comprehension by individuals.147 Yet, as Hastie has argued and
supported with data, juries as a group likely understand instructions
better than any single member does. Hastie's study of a large set of
mock juries found jury memory averaged slightly over eighty per
cent for information from judge's instructions, if one credits a jury
with recall of information that any one juror remembers.148 He also
documented significant correction of jurors' legal errors by other
jurors during deliberations, a factor other studies did not explore.149
Moreover, Hastie's :findings are based on juries that received in
structions in a manner now known to limit comprehension: jurors
received instructions only once, and only orally from the judge.1so
Second, courts could substantially improve jury comprehension
of instructions with two sorts of changes: rewriting them to reduce
complexity and legal terminology and improving the manner in
which instructions are presented. Traditionally, jurors receive in
structions orally from the judge at the end of trial, and often cannot
146. See HASTIE ET AL., supra note 67, at 168-72; Severance & Loftus, supra note 145, at
157-61, 194 (discussing studies); Vicki L. Smith, When Prior Knowledge and Law Collide:
Helping Jurors Use the Law, 17 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 507, 509-11 (1993).
147. See HASTIE ET AL., supra note 67, at 80-81, 88-89, 168-70; see also ELWORK ET AL.,
supra note 145, at 3-24 (discussing problems with jury instructions in general).
148. See HASTIE

ET AL., supra note 67, at 81.

149. See id. at 80-81 (noting that individual jurors answered questions on instructions
with 30% acccuracy, but a "more meaningful examination of memory" found the jury's col
lective memory of instructions was over 80% accurate); see also FINKEL, supra note 9, at 283
(discussing empirical studies "show[ing] that jurors do not ignore or willfully disregard in
structions but that they remember and comprehend them"). Correction of jurors' misunder
standing of instructions by other jurors repeatedly occurs in the set of eight Harris mock jury
deliberations discussed infra section IV.B. See, for example, Transcript of Harris Jury No. 2,
at 9-11 (on file with author), in which other jurors try to correct Juror 2's incorrect under
standing of the law.
150. See HASTIE ET AL., supra note 67, at 17, 49-50, 169; see also id. at 231 (recom
mending that jurors be given written copies of instructions and instructed more than once on
key rules).
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take written notes.151 Studies indicate comprehension could sub
stantially improve if jurors received written copies of instructions to
take to the jury room, if they received key instructions at the start
as well as the end of the trial, and if instructions were written in
shorter sentences using fewer arcane terms.152 Further, there is evi
dence that jurors misunderstand instructions defining crimes be
cause the definitions conflict with lay preconceptions of what acts
and circumstances constitute those crimes.153 Research indicates as
well that properly crafted instructions can largely correct this ten
dency and improve jurors' understanding of crime definitions.154
Without such reforms, we cannot assess juror capacit)r to under
stand and correctly apply instructions given optimum opportunity,
151. See, e.g., ARTiiUR D. AUSTIN, CoMPLEX LITIGATION CoNFRoNTS THE JURY SYSTEM:
CASE STUDY 55-65 (1984) (discussing juror comprehension of instructions in a case that
was tried to two juries because the first jury hung, with only the second jury receiving written
copies of the instructions and pretrial, verbal instructions); see also ABRAMSON, supra note 6,
at 91 (describing "judges' furious, quick-paced, jargon-laced set of instructions" to juries).

A

152. See AuSTIN, supra note 151, at 60-65 (noting that the instructions in the case under
study averaged 102 words per sentence, while modem American prose averages 21 words,
and were written at a "sixteenth grade level" requiring graduate education to comprehend
fully); ELWORK ET AL., supra note 145, at 3-24, 35-56; HAsnE ET AL., supra note 67, at 231;
Raymond W. Buchanan et al., Legal Communication: An Investigation into Juror Compre
hension of Pattern Instructions, CoMM. Q., Fall 1978, at 31, 32-35 (finding that jurors given
pattern instructions show better comprehension of law than uninstructed subjects); Robert P.
Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A Psycholinguistic
Study ofJury Instructions, 79 CoLUM. L. REv. 1306 (1979) (finding improved comprehension
when instructions are rewritten); Dorothy K. Kagehiro & W. Clark Stanton, Legal vs. Quan
tified Definitions of Standards of Proof, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 159 (1985) (finding that
mock jurors' decisions are affected by changes in burden-of-proof instructions); Vicki L.
Smith, Impact of Pretrial Instructions on Jurors' Information Processing and Decision Mak
ing, 76 J. APPLIED PsYCHOL. 220 (1991) (finding that instructing jurors before as well as after
trial improves juror comprehension); Smith, supra note 146, at 510, 533 (reviewing research
literature and reporting results of an experiment with a revised instruction that "produced
remarkable improvements" in mock jurors' use of legal categories rather than lay concep
tions of crime elements).
153. See Vicki L. Smith, Prototypes in the Courtroom: Lay Representations ofLegal Con
cepts, 61 J. PERSONALITY & S oc. PsYCHOL. 857 (1991); Smith, supra note 146. As an exam
ple of such preconceptions, Smith's research indicates that lay notions of kidnapping
occasionally assume that the crime requires a ransom demand, that the motive must be
money, or, in the case of child victims, that the motive arise from the context of a custody
battle. See Smith, supra, at 861 tbl. 1.; Smith, supra note 146, at 529-30.
154. See Smith, supra note 146, at 533 (finding that test instructions designed to correct
erroneous preconceptions of crime definitions "produced remarkable improvements" and
are "a promising way of improving decision accuracy").
Further, as noted above, juries seem to perform better collectively, by correcting individ
ual errors, than studies of isolated mock jurors - such as Smith's studies, see Smith, supra
note 153; Smith supra note 146 - would predict. While individual jurors may incorrectly
recall evidence or legal rules, collectively a jury has near total recall of both. See supra notes
147-49 and accompanying text; see also HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 9, at 121 ("[T]he jury
decision really derives from the deliberation of twelve people. Any lack of comprehension
on the part of individual jurors may be corrected through group discussion."). Thus, it may
be that group deliberations would suppress the effect of juror preconceptions about criminal
statutes found by Smith just as it can fill in the gaps in the memories of individual jurors.

1234
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nor draw conclusions about jurors' interpretive deficiencies sepa
rate from those caused by current instruction practices.155
Whatever a jury's capacity with regard to law application, con
siderable evidence suggests that jurors are conscientious about and
committed to following instructions and correctly applying rules,
and they believe they understand most instructions.156 More impor
tant, the largest studies of real and mock jury trials find that jurors
reach the result that lawyers and judges consider correct an over
whelming majority of the time.157 Thus, despite evidence of mis
comprehension, jurors' attempts to follow instructions are often
generally successful.158 They appear to understand, as a group,
enough of the law usually to render acceptable verdicts.159

2. Effects of Instructions on Juror Decisions
Several studies employing mock jurors have demonstrated that
jury instructions have significant effects on verdicts, leading jurors
155. Fmally, one must bear in mind the realistic standard to which jurors should be held.
The issue is not whether jurors achieve perfect recall and comprehension of instructions, but
whether, within a set of procedures that maximizes their abilities, they compare sufficiently
well to trial judges who perform similar tasks of statutory application. Most lawyers would
probably assume that judges with law degrees, practical experience, and access to law librar
ies are superior interpreters of legal rules. But I suspect empirical data might prove surpris
ing in a study comparing the comprehension of judges and jurors, especially in the lower tiers
of state courts where most jury trials occur and judges are selected by election rather than
professional merit, face considerable case-load pressures that limit research time and often
require immediate rule-application decisions, have minimal or no law clerk support, preside
over areas of law in which they have no practical experience, and face an array of pressures
or incentives arising from their institutional setting that may influence discretionary choices.
For a discussion of judicial competence, see GUINTHER, supra note 101, at xix (citing surveys
of attorneys about judicial competence in federal and state courts).
156. See id. at 59 (concluding, based on new studies and a review of research, that "jurors
generally attempt to follow all . . . instructions the judge gives them"); id. at 73 (finding that
most jurors surveyed "believed they understood 'niost' of what the judge told them about the
law, and they might not be wrong"); id. at 89 (reporting that 46% of jurors said the law given
by the judge was the most important factor in their decisions); id. at 100 (reporting a survey
of civil trial attorneys that found more than 90% agreed that jurors had grasped legal issues
well); cf. id. at 83 (reporting survey results finding that most jurors thought their fellow jurors
took their duties seriously). But see id. at 88, 99 (noting studies that find jurors discuss topics
the judge told them to ignore, such as insurance in civil trials, with such factors intruding
more often when evidence is close or the correct verdict unclear, but concluding that the
impact of such "irrelevancies" is minimal).
157. See GUINTHER, supra note 101, at 73; HASTIE ET AL., supra note 67, at 59-60 (finding
most mock juries in a homicide trial reached a verdict of second-degree murder - the cor
rect verdict, in the lawyers' opinions - with manslaughter, the next most plausibly correct
choice, occurring as the second most common verdict); KAI.VEN & ZEISEL, supra note 14, at
429-30 (finding nine percent of jury verdicts clearly incorrect).
158. See, e.g., HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 9; Bridgeman & Marlowe, supra note 126, at
97-98 (concluding that " 'the jury by and large does understand the case and get it straight,
and . . . the evidence itself is a major determinant' " (quoting KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note
14, at 162)); Myers, supra note 102, at 781.
159. See

GUINTHER, supra note 101,

at 102.
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to decisions different from ones they would reach with different in
structions or none at all. As one example, Greenwald studied juror
acceptance of self-defense claims based on battered woman's syn
drome (BWS) when the threat to the defendant was not immediate
and physical but arose instead from long-term patterns of abuse.16°
Mock jurors who received a broad "psychological" self-defense in
struction returned a substantially higher percentage of not-guilty
verdicts based on the BWS defense than jurors who received a
traditional "physical" self-defense instruction or none at all.161 The
study also provides strong evidence that instructions on substantive
criminal law significantly affect jurors. Jurors understand instruc
tions sufficiently for legal rules to prompt verdict decisions that dif
fer from their uninstructed sentiments .
Sanders and Colasanto reported similar constraining effects of
instructions . Using the same data set analyzed in section IV.B,162
they tested the effects of general intent versus specific intent in
structions on a set of mock juries deciding a case in which the de
fendant was accused of stealing from vacant property old bricks
that he claimed to believe were abandoned.163 As they should, ju
ries more frequently convicted the defendant under the general
intent instruction, which required only intent to do the act - ad
mitted by the defendant - rather than intent to violate the law.164
That finding, and further study on the binding effect of legal in
structions,165 led Sanders and Colasanto to conclude that "juries do
160. See Jessica P. Greenwald et al., Psychological Self-Defense Jury Instructions: Influ
ence on Verdicts for Battered Women Defendants, 8 BEHAv. SCI. & L. 171 (1990), discussed in
FINKEL, supra note 9, at 244-45.
161. See Greenwald et al., supra note 160, at 173-75. Greenwald sought to explore
whether a revised instruction could improve the success of self-defense claims raised by bat
tered women defendants. BWS claims are often not successful with juries, which has raised
charges that either jurors are biased or that traditional self-defense rules are constructed on a
male norm of immediate physical threat that ignores the psychological injury to women in
abusive relationships. See id. at 172-73.
162. Sanders and Colasanto's paper analyzes verdict decisions, while the next Part of this
article studies transcripts of the deliberations that yielded those decisions.
163. See Joseph Sanders & Diane Colasanto, The Use of Judicial Instructions in Jury
Decision Making 7-10 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). The fact pattern
in this experiment was based on Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952). The general
intent instruction required the jury to find only that the defendant intended the act of taking
the bricks, "and it is not necessary to establish that the defendant knew that his act was a
violation of the law." The specific-intent instruction required the jury to find that the defend
ant "knowingly did an act that the law forbids, purposely intending to violate the law." See
Sanders & Colasanto, supra, at 9-10.
164. See Sanders & Colasante, supra note 163, at 12-13.
165. Sanders and Colasanto also varied an instruction on the binding effects of the law.
One instruction told jurors that it was their duty to apply the law as the judge stated it; an
alternate version told jurors that instructions were merely intended as a helpful guide in
reaching a "just and proper verdict." Id. at 9. Consistent with the premise that the defendant
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use judicial instructions in deciding cases" and do feel constrained
by the most restrictive instructions to convict despite personal senti
ments.166 "[J]ury decision-making appears to be more principled
than when the effect of instructfons is left unexamined" and gener
ally "can be rational and principled."167
Horowitz also examined the effects of instructions imposing a
duty to the apply the law. In a large study of mock juries, he found
that a strong nullification instruction - more explicit than is used
in any jurisdiction - affected verdicts in drunken-driving and eu
thanasia cases, though in different ways. The driver-defendant was
relatively unsympathetic, and juries convicted him

more

often

under the nullification instruction.168 The euthanasia defendant, on
the other hand, was depicted very sympathetically, yet probably
was guilty under the statute; juries acquitted him more frequently
under the strong nullification instruction.169 In contrast, the in
struction had no significant effect in a typical robbery-murder
case.17° Interestingly, a weaker nullification instruction prompted
no significant differences in verdicts or deliberations compared to
juries that received no such instruction.171
Further, Horowitz observed that instructions affected the con
tents of deliberations. When informed of nullification power, jurors
spent less time discussing evidence and more on defendant charac
teristics, especially in the euthanasia case.172 They also gave more
consideration to the case outcome and the defendant's intent in
their evaluations of evidence.173 Instructions changed not only ver
dicts but also the reasoning by which they were reached. Note the
was a sympathetic man whom many would want to acquit, jurors receiving the no·duty in
struction acquitted more often; those on whom the instructions imposed a duty to apply the
general-intent rule usually convicted. See id. at 13, 17.
166. See id. at 13, 17.
167. Id at 13, 17-18.
168. See Horowitz, Effect, supra note 94, at 31-32, 34.
169. See id. at 31-32.
170. See id. at 33.
171. See id. at 30-32. The weaker nullification instruction was one still used in Maryland,
one of two states that give nullification instructions. See id. at 30.
172. See id. at 34-35. A subsequent study found the same effect whether the nullification
information came from a judge's (strong version) instruction or merely a defense attorney's
argument: jurors treated sympathetic defendants more leniently and dangerous defendants
more harshly. See Horowitz, Impact, supra note 94, at 446. Thus, a defense nullification
argument backfired and increased the likelihood of a guilty verdict in an unsympathetic
drunken-driver case. In scenarios in which the prosecutor challenged the defense nullifica
tion argument, the nullification effect was significantly diminished. See id. at 446; id. at 452
(concluding that "a challenge, and not a very direct one at that, to nullification sentiments is
quite sufficient to curb the juries' potential desire to be liberated from the evidence").
173. See Horowitz, Impact, supra note 94, at 450-51.
.
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characteristics of deliberations without nullification information:
Horowitz found them focused on evidence and legal issues, with
little attention to legally irrelevant matters. Yet even the broader
considerations that the strong nullification instruction prompted
may fit within a practical-reasoning description of criminal judg
ment as an evaluation of character. Some attention to certain de
fendant characteristics - like mental capacity or motive, but not
race - and to the justice of the outcome may contribute legiti
mately to an assessment of moral blameworthiness that criminal
law theorists identify as a necessary component of a just guilty
judgment.174
Finally, the seminal study examining the effect of instructions on
juries - the Chicago Jury Project's experiments on the insanity de
fense - found that instructions had a significant effect.175 Tested
with sixty-eight mock juries, the study found that juries given an
insanity defense instruction based on the M'Naghten176 case re
turned guilty verdicts significantly more often than juries given a
Durham177 instruction or an instruction with no legal standard,

which presumably allowed community sentiment to provide the
rule.178

Jurors given the Durham instruction also deliberated

longer.179
The M'Naghten instruction makes the defendant's ability to dis
tinguish right from wrong the basis of its insanity standard. Inter
estingly, however, jurors given the other two instructions often
addressed

that

ability

as

well,

though

less

frequently

than

174. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 29, at 313-14, 373 (noting that we may rightly
judge less harshly the mother who impulsively kills the rapist of her daughter than the man
who impulsively kills a gay person out of homophobic hatred, because the former held a
socially appropriate valuation of her daughter's well-being while the latter held a socially
condemnable prejudice).
175. See SIMON, supra note 91, at 70-77, 184-85, 199.
176. M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & Fmnelly 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843), discussed
in SIMON, supra note 91, at 8 (noting that "[u]nder the M'Naghten rule the defendant is
excused only if he did not know what he was doing or did not know that what he was doing
was wrong"). For the instruction given to mock jurors, see SIMON, supra note 91, at 45.
177. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), discussed in SIMON, supra
note 91, at 8 (noting the Durham rule "states that a defendant is excused if his act was the
product ofa mental disease or defecf'). For the instruction given to mock jurors, see SIMON,
supra note 91, at 45-46. See also id. at 72-73 (noting that the Durham instruction "produces a
powerful difference in jurors' verdicts" compared to the M'Naghten instruction).
178. The "standardless" instruction stated only: "[I]f you believe the defendant was in
sane at the time he committed the act of which he is accused, then you must find the defend
ant not guilty by reason of insanity." SIMON, supra note 91, at 46; see also id. at 72-73
(summarizing jury verdict data for different instructions). But see FINKEL, supra note 9, at
280-82 (reporting other Studies of insanity instructions that yielded no significant differences
in verdicts).
179. See SIMON, supra note 91, at 75.
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may have helped

shape.180 That seems to suggest that the M'Naghten standard incor
porates an issue that popular sentiment considers crucial to deter
minations of responsibility in insanity cases. It also suggests that lay
approaches to criminal judgment, at least in this context, use con
siderations that explore the defendant's moral capacity.181
E.

Conclusion

The foregoing review of empirical literature reveals considera
ble evidence that juries reason, incorporate contextual and norma
tive considerations, and reach outcomes in ways comparable to
judicial decisionmaking. What the literature does not fully answer
is

how jurors

reach their verdicts in light of the interacting effects of

fact interpretation, strong norms and justice notions, approaches of
legal reasoning, and application of instructions. More specifically,
we still do not have a description of rule interpretation by juries in
terms of contemporary legal-reasoning strategies - a description of
the content of jury reasoning about statutes. Values and norms
sometimes affect verdicts, but we understand that some effects of
values in judicial interpretation are both inevitable and, in some
forms, normatively attractive. If we can determine the considera
tions that lead jurors away from literal interpretations, we may find
that they resemble judicial interpretive strategies that are widely
regarded as acceptable, and even desirable. Qualitative study of
jury deliberations can help us build a new, positive description of
jury application of rules, one grounded in actual jury practice, as a
process of practical reason.182 That description, in tum, will pro
vide a basis for normative reassessment of how well juries interpret
statutes.

N.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN JURY DELIBERATIONS

With the background of statutory-interpretation theory and the
insights of empirical jury research, I now look at jury deliberations
180. See id.
181. For a more extensive discussion, see id. at 132-80.
182. Even deliberations are not a full window into juror reasoning, just as judicial opin
ions do not reveal the full range of considerations and influences on judges' decisionmaking.
Cf. W.S. MERWIN, AsIAN FIGURES 65 (1973) (recounting a Chinese proverb: "A judge de
cides for ten reasons, nine of which nobody knows"). It is clear that most jurors come to the
deliberation with fairly strong inclinations toward a verdict option, which means they have
reasoned alone, silently, about the application of rules to the facts. Not all of such private
reasoning is likely to be revealed in group deliberation, nor are key factors that change ju
rors' minds during deliberation necessarily clear from the spoken discussion.
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in two cases in order to construct a preliminary theory of jury inter
pretation of statutes. The cases complement each other in the in
sights they collectively provide into jury reasoning. Both involve
application of relatively simple statutes to cases in which the facts
of the defendant's conduct and circumstances are not in real dis
pute. Both focus on different but related issues of mens rea - the
defendant's knowledge or intention. In both cases juries explicitly
focus on the language of relevant instructions to decide those is
sues. Yet the factual contexts vary in significant ways that are use

ful for comparative study.

Wisconsin

v.

Reed

involves a very

sympathetic, mentally challenged defendant, while

Harris

Michigan

v.

centers on a defendant of normal intelligence for whom

some jurors express modest sympathy but others do not.

Reed is

a

gun-possession case, a regulatory charge that implicates back
ground concerns of public safety.1s3

in se

Harris is

a theft case, a

malum

offense that invokes strong norms of property rights. These

factual permutations lead juries to draw on a range of different con
siderations in their struggles to resolve application of scienter re
quirements and, through that process, pass judgment on the
defendant's culpability.
A.

Statutory Interpretation by the Jury in

Wisconsin v. Reed

With permission of a Wisconsin state court, the PBS documen
tary program Frontline arranged to videotape the deliberations of
jurors in an actual criminal case. In that case, Leroy Reed was
charged with possession of a gun by a convicted felon. The facts
were undisputed.184 Reed had been convicted of a felony several
years earlier. He was not steadily employed and, according to ex
pert testimony - which his in-court behavior seemed to confirm he was of "substantially sub-average" intelligence and could read
only at a second-grade level. He legally purchased a handgun as
part of a plan to take a mail-order course ·to become a private
detective. While "hanging around the courthouse," a police officer
asked Reed for identification and he produced the bill of sale for
the gun he had purchased. He explained that he was taking a corre
spondence course to become a private detective and, as part of the
course, needed the gun for protection. The officer discovered that
183. Though one might predict that a case in which a defendant is charged solely with
having purchased and possessed a handgun - which was illegal for him because of his status
as a convicted felon - might raise norms invoking a right to bear arms arising from the
Constitution's Second Amendment, in fact no juror in Reed alluded to such norms or rights.
184. See Frontline: Inside the Jury Room, supra note 1.
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Reed had a criminal record and asked Reed to go home, get the
gun, and bring it to the police department; Reed did so. He gave
officers a statement that he owned the gun, and he was arrested.
In closing arguments, the prosecutor emphasized that jurors had
agreed to apply the law without sympathy or speculation.185 The
defense attorney in effect argued for jury nullification, suggesting
that "the law is being misapplied to these facts," and that "you have
the power, despite all the technical legality, to find Leroy Reed not
guilty. You're not violating the law by doing this."186 The judge,
however, refused to give a jury instruction on nullification; he told
the jurors that they must follow legal instructions.187 The statute
required proof of three elements for conviction: that Reed was a
convicted felon; that he possessed a gun; and that he knew he pos
sessed the gun.
The elements of the statute seemed clear to the jury; several
jurors identified the three elements and noted that they had to find
them proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict.188 The
jury deliberated more than two hours before reaching a unanimous
verdict of acquittal, and its discussion touched on several interpre
tive strategies courts use to construe statutes. Several jurors, during
their first round of comments, adopted a plain-meaning view of the
statute and stated that they believed the three elements had been
proven "technically."189 For a minority of jurors, this consideration
was sufficiently strong that it led them to a preliminary vote of
guilty, and no juror initially thought the statute ambiguous. One of
the traditional considerations of statutory interpretation - ordi
nary meaning of the text - was thus a strong factor early in the
deliberation.
Some jurors spoke hesitantly or apologetically of feeling "sym
pathy" and of allowing that to affect their judgment.190 A vocal
minority - apparently "rule-oriented" thinkers - explicitly chas
tised or discouraged such sympathetic, contextual considerations.
185. See id.
186. Id.
187. See id.

Recalling Horowitz's study, we would expect the defense argument to have
some effect on deliberations and the verdict, but that effect should be mitigated by the prose
cutor's counterargument. See Horowitz, Impact, supra note 94, at 443-46. In his second
study, Horowitz tested mock jurors with a simulated trial based closely on Reed; he found a
strong effect of nullification arguments and instructions for this fact scenario. See id.

188. See Frontline: Inside the Jury Room, supra note 1.
189. Jurors' comments included: "Technically, the man is guilty . . . ."; "I agree that Mr.
Reed is guilty based on the law."; and "I think those three elements have been met that yes
he is guilty of the crime."

190. See id.

Id.

·
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They urged that the statute's plairi meaning was the only proper
consideration and it mandated a guilty verdict.191 This strand of the
debate exhibits a clear conception of the jury's proper institutional
role - to apply law objectively without excessive influence by emo
tional, subjective considerations - and also about the proper way
that the law should be applied. The argument contains a clear un
derlying sense - though it does not prevail - that law should be
read and applied in a literal, mechanical manner; facts or senti
ments not identified as relevant by such a common-sense reading of
the statute should play little or no role in the final judgment.192
Several jurors, however, expressed discomfort with this literal
reading of the statute. The facts that troubled some jurors - the
defendant's sympathetic character, due to his substandard intelli
gence and clearly nonthreatening demeanor, and also the question
able police judgment in arresting such a person even after his full
cooperation193 - were not legally relevant ones in a narrow sense.
These sentiments conflict with the initial pull of the text's plain
meaning. The jury's attention to them corresponds to a practical
reasoning approach of judges who may reconsider a statute's plain
meaning if other factors point toward alternate constructions.194
Prompted by these concerns, the

Reed

jury addressed a wide

range of considerations familiar from judicial statutory interpreta
tion. One recurring theme was . a counteivision to the literal ap
proach of the jury's role in applying the law. One juror, a doctor,
stated, " [I]t's a tough position to be in, to say I am a judge of the
191. See id. This is behavior we see throughout the Harris juries' deliberations as well.
See infra section IV.B.
192. Juror comments recounted in HANs & VroMAR, supra note 9, at 156-57 (quoting a
juror explaining why she voted guilty despite her sympathy for the defendants' actions: "I'm
in agreement with what they're trying to accomplish . . . but they did break the law. . . . [M]y
personal views don't count. . . . If we allow people to break the law, we're akin to anarchy. . . .
I knew they were guilty when we were charged by the judge. I did not know prior to that
time - I was in full agreement with the defendants until we were charged by the judge. That
was the kiss of death!"), corroborate this constraint. See also Sanders & Colasanto, supra
note 163, at 17 (reporting the results of experiments with a large set of mock juries that
found, inter alia, that jurors felt constrained by an intent instruction to convict a defendant
when, without such an instruction, they more frequently acquitted}.
193.

See Frontline: Inside the Jury Room, supra note 1.

194. See EsKRIDGE, supra note 4, at 55-57; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 40, at 352. We
can also recognize the relational reasoning Conley and O'Barr identified in lay litigants; de
spite the text's plain meaning, several jurors intuited notions of social justice, social roles, and
responsibility that conflicted with that meaning. See supra notes 123-38 and accompanying
text. We might recognize here also the Rawlsian process of checking the formal application
of general rules against a more context-sensitive situation sense about the proper outcome of
a given case - against our "considered judgment." See RAWLS, supra note 38, at 20-21, 4852, 579.
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law, but I think that's what the jury system is for."195 He repeatedly
insisted "I am not a computer" and argued that the jury's job was
more than to assess mechanically whether evidence met literal
readings of the statute:
But I think we have more capabilities than to say, one, two, three,
these [elements] are met on a very simple level. Cut and dried, guilty.
I don't think that we as jurors, that is necessarily our role. We are
here to do more than that. I'm trying to decide in my own mind, has
justice been done here? I don't care what the law says. Has justice
been done . .. . That's what we're here to do. 196

This view holds that justice considerations have a proper place
in reaching a verdict and exhibits an intuitive construction of the
jury's role in the legal system.197 This sense of institutional purpose
gave jurors a conceptual opening to consider approaches other than
a literal reading of the statute.198 Another juror offered the com
puter metaphor as well and struggled with the same issue of
whether a jury could do anything other than literal rule application:
Are we obligated . . . to follow the letter of the law and find him
guilty, or are we obligated as a jury to use our special level of con
science . . .. According to the law as it's written, he meets the criteria.
Do we rise above that somehow? Is there a place for us to then say
. .. we cannot in good conscience find him guilty?199

At least two jurors, throughout most of the deliberation,
thought not. A vocal minority of jurors insisted that only a literal
application of the statute was within the jury's authority.200 Even
195. Frontline: Inside the Jury Room, supra note 1.
196. Id. The context of this case may have led some jurors to assume that jurors have a
broader role in applying the law. The case contained no factual disputes, and factfinding is a
key jury function. With that task effectively eliminated, jurors may have searched for an
other purpose for their role. This sense of the jury's role in law interpretation is much
weaker in the Harris juries. See infra section IV.B.
197. Chicago Jury Project researchers found similar evidence in mock jury deliberations
that jurors sometimes consider the jury's institutional role within the justice system. See
SIMON, supra note 91, at 163-70. They noted "the jury's recognition of its representative role
and its sense of responsibility to society," id. at 170-71, and much discussion of the distinction
between "the expert's function and the jury's responsibility," id. at 163. They concluded that
"[t]he jury is too impressed with its importance as an institution and with its responsibility to
the court and to the community at large to relinquish its decision-making powers." Id. at 170.
198. This sense of their role recalls Huigens's point that "we do instruct juries. We do not
mechanically hold persons to account against a rigid code." Huigens, supra note 30, at 1466.
Huigens continues his point with an argument that describes both the Reed jury's predica
ment and key points of its deliberations: "We employ juries because we place the person
prior to the rule, because we are sensitive to the possibility that none of the rules may be
adequate to describe justice in the given situation, and because the rules may conflict in a
way that only human hands can unravel." Id.
199. Frontline: Inside the Jury Room, supra note 1.
200. See id. Interestingly, in Reed as well as in Harris, it was the better-educated jurors
- a doctor, college professor, school psychologist, and teacher - who were most willing to
explore interpretations beyond plain meaning. Those with presumably less formal education
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jurors who, early in deliberations, expressed an inclination to medi
ate literal application with other considerations made clear that
they agreed generally with this criminal statute and were hesitant to
disregard it. One such juror insisted that he wanted "to be a good
juror" and added, in a sentiment explicitly stated by at least one
other juror as well, "I think this is a good law. And I don't want to
say or do anything that suggests that I don't take that law seri
ously. "201 Nevertheless, jurors such as these (the majority) demon
strated - to recall Conley and O'Barr's formulation - a less rule
oriented reasoning than those who argued throughout for literal
application.
Most jurors were troubled sufficiently by contextual factors to
make them notable parts of the discussion.

One juror's ·justice

calculus - whether the legal process has punished the defendant
sufficiently without conviction - corresponds well with the findings
of Kalven and Zeisel's jury study.202 "Leroy Reed has really had
enough punishment, if you will, for what he did that was so wrong
. . . . Between his arrest and between his days in court now, an
awful lot must have happened to him."203 While appropriately fo
cused on normative justice for the defendant, this view neglects the
importance of the verdict as a judgment on his culpability. Yet if
jurors are at fault for making such an evaluation, it is a fault they
share with judges. Studies of urban traffic courts find judges fre
quently dismiss cases on the rationale that having to come to court
is punishment enough for a minor ticket.204
Several jurors' concerns had a relational and instrumental tone.
One juror was troubled by what she considered improper police be
havior. "I don't think if they are living to the letter of the law that
[the police officer] had any right to ask this man to go home and
bring in that weapon."205 While her assumption about the law is
- a fireman and tool maker - argued hardest for plain meaning. This anecdotal observa
tion, of course, tells us little about general correlations between education levels (or other
demographic variations) and approaches to statutory interpretation. But it suggests an ave
nue for further study that would build on existing research that examines how demographic
differences correlate with participation in the jury room. Some studies suggest, for example,
that more educated jurors speak more often in deliberations, raise more legal issues, and rate
judges' instructions as less clear than do jurors with less education. See, e.g., liAsnE ET AL.,
supra note 67, at 135-38 (reporting such findings and noting other studies).

201. Frontline: Inside the Jury Room, supra note 1.
202. See KAI.VEN & ZEISEL, supra note 14, at 301-05.
203. Frontline: Inside the Jury Room, supra note 1.
204. See E. Au.AN LIND & ToM R. TYLER, THE SoCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
-

JUSTICE 2 (1988).

205. Frontline: Inside the Jury Room, supra note 1.

.
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incorrect, her concern reveals a relational-reasoning inclination to
place judgment of the defendant's conduct in a broader context of
morally or socially improper official behavior. Jurors also explicitly
discussed signaling the prosecutor's office about the use of its dis
cretion in pursuing this charge, again setting the defendant's con
duct in a broader context that gives attention to the moral judgment
of other actors.206 One juror said he "wine[ed]" as "a cognitive 7
year old [the defendant207] get[s] caught up in this legal mechanism
. . . with this exquisitely agonizing thoroughness" and "puts him
through the entire mill. . . . It was like watching a grown man beat a
child."208 Voicing a comparable instrumental concern, another ju
ror assessed the social need for a conviction. "I look at the defend
ant and I think, '[I]s he a threat to society?' . . . And if he's
dangerous to society, why would the [police] detective . . . allow him
to bring the gun in, transport it on a public bus . . . if he felt that he
was a dangerous felon?"209
Such instrumental concerns are familiar components of legal
reasoning.210 Yet if the jury based its verdict on such factors, its
rationale and reasoning would rightly be condemned for neglecting
its objective of voicing moral judgment on individual conduct, and
perhaps for ignoring statutory text.

Interestingly, however, the

Reed jury did not abandon statute application to base its verdict

explicitly on such concerns. In accord with its resistance to nonlit
eral statute construction, the jury eventually turned to a close anal
ysis of statutory language, reading key terms consistently with the
considerations pointing away from a guilty verdict. A minority of
206. See id.
207. The defense's expert witness at trial stated that the defendant had the cognitive ca
pacity of a seven-year-old. See id.
208. Id. In response to the perceived inappropriateness of the prosecution, this juror
elsewhere says, "I'd like to send [a message] to the DA's office. . . . [T]he message would be,
dammit to hell, I'm afraid to walk to my car in the parking lot. . . . [My students are] being
mugged. And you give me, you give me Leroy. And I feel like saying, guys, you're doing a
hell of a job." Id.
209. Id. Another juror immediately responded "I don't think that's a question," and then
another went on to discuss "these bigger questions about where's justice, who's being served,
and why was this case brought?" Id.
210. One obvious example is the law-and-economics movement's argument that the in
centive effects of rules should serve efficiency or other behavioral goals, but instrumental
concerns have a broader history in modem legal reasoning as well. See RoBERT SUMMERS,
INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY (1982).
The Supreme Court has also identified instrumental concerns as part of the justification
for the Sixth Amendment's criminal jury trial right. See, e.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S.
162, 174-75 (1986) (asserting that juries guard against the " 'exercise of arbitrary power' "
coming from an " 'overzealous or mistaken prosecutor' " (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522, 530 (1975)); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 373 (1972) (same); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (same).
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the jurors was inclined to apply the statute literally and reach a
guilty verdict; the remainder wanted a way to vote not guilty and
yet do so within a good-faith application of the statute.
Discussion of statutory language focused on the word "know" in
the element of the statute requiring that the defendant knew he had
a gun. Jurors' reluctance to ignore the law and desire for a just
outcome led them to explore whether this defendant, who had lim
ited cognitive capabilities, knew he possessed the gun. The context
and purpose of the term's application to this cognitively subaverage
defendant were important. Jurors struggled to construct and agree
upon a functional definition of "know." One juror - an English
professor - admitted, "I'm having trouble with the word 'gun,' but
I'm really having trouble with that word 'to know.' "211 Another
juror, a school psychologist, suggested this inquiry:
I wonder if we could find room in the law, for those of us that feel we
need to follow the letter of the law, that perhaps he didn't, in the full
sense of the word, know he was a felon, and didn't, in the full sense of
the word, know that he possessed a firearm. . . . Even among psychol
ogists this is going to be a very debatable issue. You know, I think
we're talking about at what level did he know it, we need what that
is.212

The jurors who held out the longest for a guilty verdict resisted this
level of inquiry into the statute's meaning.213 But most jurors found
it relevant and persuasive, seemingly because it helped to bridge
their broader justice concerns about convicting the defendant with
their desire to apply the statute with integrity rather than disregard
it.

In construing the word "know," the

Reed

jurors faced a recur

ring problem of interpretive construction in criminal law of the type
that Kelm.an argued is typically resolved "nonrationally."214 Yet
the jury's construction of this mens rea term resembles a well
established judicial policy for construing criminal statutes - the
rule of lenity. That rule, grounded largely on notions of fair warn
ing, calls for penal statutes to be construed narrowly, so that ambi
guities work in favor of the defendant.215 Courts recognize that the
211. Frontline: Inside the Jury Room, supra note 1.
212. Id.
213. See id.
214. See Kelman, supra note 88; see also supra text accompanying notes 84-91.
215. See, e.g., United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 949-50 (1988); Rewis v. United
States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971); WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. Scarr, JR., CruM!NAL
LAW 77-78 {2d ed. 1986) {discussing the rule of lenity); id. at 76 (noting that "courts some
times conclude that what seems to be clear language is so harsh or foolish or devoid of sense
that it is ambiguous after all"); id. at 78-79 (noting that courts continue to apply the rule of
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rule varies, however, with the nature of the crime. For plainly
wrong or horrible

(malum in se) crimes, the rule applies less strin
gently than for malum prohibitum crimes that violate no clear social

norms.216 Reed's crime was hardly a clear moral wrong.211 He vio

lated a typical regulatory statute that should be construed narrowly
under the lenity rule.21s Moreover, in finding an ambiguity219 in the
state-of-mind requirement and then opting for a more stringent
construction, the

Reed

jury mimicked a longstanding judicial cus

tom of increasing the level of the required mens rea element, or
implying one even when the statute does not provide it, in order to
effectuate the lenity rule and ensure that a culpable mental state
accompanies any conviction.22°
Mens rea elements often serve a decision-rule function of guid
ing the individualized judgment of culpability.221 Such a judgment
in

Reed had

to take account of the defendant's limited intelligence

- a fact central to assessing his culpability, his capacity for practi
cal judgment, and thereby his character. But it had to do so without
clear guidance from criminal rules, because Reed could not make a
plausible insanity plea and was found competent to stand trial.
Dan-Cohen summarizes the common law tradition of construct
ing scienter elements by concluding that "the defendant's state of
mind satisfies the mens rea requirement in a criminal statute if the
defendant perceives the facts and the nature of his conduct in terms
of the statute's ordinary-language description of them. "222 The
lenity even after legislatures have ostensibly repealed it, because the rule "seems to be an
attitude of mind that is not readily changed by legislation").
216. See O.W. Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 50 {1881); J.W. HuRST, DEALING WITH
STATUTES 64-65 (1982) (arguing that courts follow community standards as a context in
which to coµstrue the ambit of a statute); LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 215, at 79 (noting
that the rule applies more strictly to crimes "involving morally bad conduct
than those
involving conduct not so bad").
217. On the contrary, gun ownership accords with a strong constitutional norm grounded
in the Second Amendment right to bear arms, though jurors did not mention this.
218. The Model Penal Code replaces the lenity rule with one requiring that statutory
terms be given their "fair import." See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(3) (1985). One arguably
can interpret the statutory term "know" as the jury did in the Reed case under the approach
of the Model Penal Code as well.
219. Nor is the jury doing anything different from courts in finding a simple word like
"know" ambiguous. See LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 215, at 76-79.
220. See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437 (1978) (stat
ing that the Court, "in keeping with the common-law tradition and with the general injunc·
tion that 'ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of
lenity,' has on a number of occasions read a state-of-mind component into an offense even
when the statutory definition did not in terms so provide" (quoting Lewis v. United States,
401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971)).
221. See supra notes 20-30 and accompanying text.
222. Dan-Cohen, supra note 20, at 662.
. • •
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mens rea requirement calls not only for knowledge of facts but also
"of the legal categories under which they fall," both of which de
pend on "linguistic categories."223

One is aware of a given fact only when one can provide some cer
tain description of it. When we inquire into a defendant's state of
mind and ask whether she was aware of the nature of her conduct, we
must already possess a tentative (or hypothetical) description of a
mode of conduct provided by the relevant criminal statute. It is only
against such a description that we can ascertain and judge the defend
ant's state of mind: did her perception of the facts match the descrip
tion in the statute? One can, for example, fully appreciate the fact
that one's finger is pulling a small metal lever connected ·to a larger
metal instrument and yet fail to know that one is "pulling the trigger
of a gun" or that one is "shooting," let alone that one is about to
"kill" someone. To say simply that mens rea requires knowledge only
of facts obscures the crucial choice of the description against which
the adequacy of that knowledge will be measured.224
From this analysis - which develops Kelman's argument about
choices in interpretive construction225 - we can further understand
both the

Reed jury's

difficulty with constructing an appropriate def

inition of knowledge and the difficulty of factually describing
Reed's mens rea.226 The jurors' effort to define the content of the
word "know" was an attempt to arrive at a "description of a mode
of conduct" against which to compare Reed's state of mind. Dan
Cohen's example of the choices one must make to construct a base
line description of firing a gun to commit a homicide is precisely
analogous to the

Reed

jury's choice among alternative levels of

knowledge against which to judge Reed. One juror described just
such a change in his baseline choice this way:

. . . I came into this room saying the same thing, yes, the three points
are met, on face value, he's guilty. Now those first two points, you
could define them, you know, it says that he had to know that he
possessed a gun. He might have "known" that he possessed a piece of
his [private detective] course. . . . Maybe he just was simply following
instructions. He had no relationship like you or I or anybody else does
in this room between a gun and bang-bang. . . . [He thinks] he's now
going to be a detective. "I'm going to be a stand-up citizen and be a
detective," and the course says-something about a gun. He's going to
do everything he can to do it right. Did he really know what he was
223. Id.
224. Id. at

662-63.

225. See Kelman, supra note 88; supra text accompanying notes 84-91.
226. Cf. supra section III.A (discussing empirical research regarding story-based interpre
tation of facts).
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doing or the consequences, did he know a gun was purchased, or did he
purchase an item of his course. 221

Rather than inappropriately reading ambiguity into a clear and
simple term, the

Reed jurors

recognized and explicitly debated an

inevitable choice that must be made in statutory application - a
choice no doubt frequently overlooked by judges and juries alike.228
We can see why Reed's mental capacity prompted this inquiry and
made his case difficult. Dan-Cohen notes that a defendant needs
"merely ordinary linguistic aptitude" to understand criminal rules
and that a mens rea requirement is "satisfied when the defendant
has acted with the awareness normally possessed by an intelligent
member of a moral and linguistic community."229 The jury quite
plausibly concluded that Reed lacked such ordinary capacity,230 and
as a consequence his blameworthiness was insufficient to warrant a
conviction. Thus in

Reed,

as in criminal judgments generally, the

decisions made in construction of statutes involve unavoidable nor
mative choices. Through such choices criminal judgment is always,
at some level, a personal, moral, and context-sensitive assess
ment.231
This interpretive struggle suggests - contrary to some commen
tators, including the Frontline narrator232 - that the verdict was
not an act of nullification. That is, the jury did not deliberately dis
regard a statute that by all plausible constructions mandated con
viction. Rather, they construed the statute, motivated by justice,
policy, and moral concerns, in a manner that allowed, or even re
quired, a not-guilty verdict. We can see, in the jury's extended ef
fort to arrive at a working definition of the statutory term, the same
sort of decisionmaking that has prompted scholars of judicial deci
sionmaking to describe statutory interpretation as inevitably a pro
cess of creative policymaking. It also provides an effective example
of practical reasoning in criminal-statute construction. In turn, we
see how practical reason serves the task of criminal adjudication to
227. Frontline: Inside the Jury Room, supra note 1 (emphasis added).
228. That judges overlook such choices in interpretive construction is a central point
made by Mark Kelman. See Kelman, supra note 88.
229. Dan-Cohen, supra note 20, at 663.
230. This is true even though his capacity did not implicate competency or insanity rules.
231. See Huigens, supra note 30; supra text accompanying notes 27-38.
232. See Frontline: Inside the Jury Room, supra note 1; see also Horowitz, Impact, supra
note 94, at 443 (describing the Reed verdict as resulting from "the jury's explicit decision to
nullify the law"); Alan W. Scheflin & Jon M. Van Dyke, Merciful Juries: The Resilience of
Jury Nullification, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 165, 168 (1991) (describing the Reed verdict as
nullification).

March

1998]

Jury Interpretation

1249

assess ex post whether one who violates a rule of conduct is
blameworthy.
B.

Statutory Interpretation in the Mock Jury Deliberations of
Michigan v. Harris

While

Reed

presents the problem of defining the content of a

single statutory term in light of several contextual factors, Michigan
v. Harris233 raises the difficulty of defining the reach of a state-of
mind requirement across several statutory elements. The

Harris ju

ries easily defined the content of the intent requirement and fo
cused on whether it applied to circumstance as well as conduct
elements. Because they pursued this problem of statutory interpre
tation with reference to a widely held social norm based in the com
mon law, we also can view the

Harris juries as using a public-values

analysis common in judicial interpretation.

In

Harris,

fictional defendant William Harris is a retired ma

chinist who took a pile of bricks from a vacant property on which
they had been sitting for the eight months since the property's sole
building had burned down.234 All remains of the burned building
except the bricks had been removed. The lot was fenced and had a
"private property" sign but lacked a gate.235 The bricks were
marred by burn scars and old mortar. Harris stated at trial that he
came to assume, during the eight months between when the build
ing burned and when he took the bricks, that the bricks were aban
doned. So, one afternoon Harris loaded them into his truck, took
them home, cleaned them, and built a barbecue with them. He was
seen loading the bricks by a woman who lived across the street from
the vacant property and who knew him socially. When the owner
233. The case file was constructed, and this mock jury experiment conducted, by Profes
sor Joseph Sanders and his colleagues at the University of Michigan. Sanders had 48 mock
juries, usually six members each, deliberate for about 30 minutes each. Not all reached unan
imous verdicts. The variables tested were public ownership versus private ownership of the
property; general-intent instructions versus specific-intent instructions; and an instruction
commanding jurors to follow the law given by the judge versus one stating that the law was
intended only to be helpful in reaching a just and proper verdict. The experiment is further
described in James A. Holstein, Jurors' Interpretations and Jury Decision Making, 9 LAW &
HUM. BEHAv. 83, 86-89 (1985). My data for this article consists of eight transcribed jury
deliberations - one from each "cell" of the research design, that is, one deliberation under
each of the variable conditions - as well as the paper by Sanders and Diane Colasanto,
supra note 163, which analyzed the verdicts of all 48 mock juries.
234. For the background facts of the Harris mock case, see the Ha"is Case Stimulus (on
file with author).
235. Ownership of the property was actually one of the variables tested in this mock trial;
half the juries were told an individual owned the lot and that it was posted "private prop
erty," while the other half were told the state of Michigan owned it, and thus the sign read
"property of the state of Michigan." See Sanders & Colasanto, supra note 163, at 8-9.
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reported the bricks missing to the police, the police checked with
the woman, and she identified Harris. Harris admitted to the po
lice, and at trial, that he took the bricks because he thought they
were abandoned.
The only real legal issue in

Harris,

then, was the defendant's

state of mind. Half the mock juries on the

Harris

case received a

general-intent instruction, which stated in part that "the defend
ant's intention is inferred from his voluntary commission of the act
forbidden by law, and it is not necessary to establish that the de
fendant knew that his act was a violation of the law."236 The other
half received a specific-intent instruction, which stated in part that
"the crime charged in this case requires proof of specific intent . . . .
To establish specific intent the government must prove that the de
fendant knowingly did an act which the law forbids, purposely in
tending to violate the law."237 In addition, both juries were told:

To sustain the charge of theft, the State must prove the following
propositions:
First: That Steven P. Connolly238 was the owner of the bricks in ques
tion; and
Second: That the defendant knowingly obtained unauthorized control
over the bricks; and
Third: That the defendant intended to deprive Steven P. Connolly
permanently of the use or benefit of the bricks.239
Thus structured, the

Harris

case poses a familiar issue of crimi

nal law: the nature of a defendant's intent and the nature of intent
required for conviction. Must the defendant intend only the physi
cal act - picking up bricks - or also the consequences - depriv
ing the owner of their use? Must he intend also the criminal nature
of the act, that is, must he intend to commit a crime,. or at least
intend to do something he knows is wrong? The differing instruc
tions address this issue, but the language common to both raises it
as well. The

Harris juries

struggled with whether the requirement

that "the defendant knowingly obtained unauthorized control"
meant: (a) that he took the bricks - which he happened not to
have authority to do - to which his knowledge or mistaken belief
was irrelevant, or (b) that he took the bricks

knowing he

was not

authorized to do so. They debated, in other words, a basic problem
236. Id. at 9-10.
237. Id. at 10.
238. For the half of the juries told that property was publicly owned, the instructions
substituted "the state of Michigan" for Connelly's name. See supra note 235.
239. 'I!anscript of Michigan v. Harris Trial Simulation 12-13 (instructions given to mock
juries) (on file with author); see, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 8, at 11 (on file with
author); 'I!anscript for Harris Jury No. 2, at 16.
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of criminal code construction: does the mens rea requirement ex
tend only to the conduct element, or also to the circumstance ele
ment?240 This interpretive problem goes to the heart of defining
culpability: Is one blameworthy under the former construction, or
only under the latter? For answers, jurors turned to a core set of
norms and a broader set of interpretive strategies.
The Harris fact pattern includes several elements addressed by
jurors that point toward acquittal. Some jurors find the defendant
somewhat sympathetic; he has no criminal record, save for a reck
less driving conviction.241 His alleged criminal act and its resulting
harm were, in the view of some jurors, de minimus.242 Others
viewed it as conduct better addressed by civil proceedings focused
on restitution rather than criminal blame.243 In accord with Kalven
and Zeisel's :findings about assessments of victim's behavior, several
juries raised the issue of whether the property owner was remiss in
not putting a gate on the property, posting a sign on the bricks, or
otherwise preventing the appearance of abandonment.244 More
over, for many jurors, the defendant's claim that he intended no
crime and believed he was taking abandoned property made his in
tent insufficient for conviction.24s
None were sufficiently strong to overcome many jurors' plain
language interpretations of the statute, particularly under the
general-intent instruction.

The plain-language approach here is

strengthened by considerations that point toward conviction, lead
ing many jurors to feel no need to explore interpretations of intent
instructions that would support acquittal.246 The most important
240. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 7, at 8-10.
241. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 6, at 6, 10 (deciding that Harris was "not a
criminal," even to those convinced he committed this criminal act). Other jurors had no
sympathy for the defendant. See, e.g., 'Ii"anscript for Harris Jury No. 4, at 26 ("I think the guy
was trying to get away with something."). Like the Reed jurors, members of several of the
Harris juries disapproved of allowing "sympathy" to affect their judgment and tried, con
sciously at least, not to allow sympathy or emotion to affect their, or fellow jurors', judg
ments. See Transcript for Harris Jury No. 1, at 10; 'Ii"anscript for Harris Jury No. 2, at 22.
242. See, e.g., 'Ii"anscript for Harris Jury No. 4, at 13.
243. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 8, at 8 (several jurors agreeing that the "equi
table" outcome would be restitution or "return the bricks and it's all over").
244. See Transcript for Harris Jury No. 5, at 2, 10-11; Transcript for Harris Jury No. 7, at 4;
Transcript for Harris Jury No. 8, at 7; see also KAI.VEN & ZEISEL, supra note 14, at 242-57.
245. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 6, at 5, 7; Transcript for Harris Jury No. 7, at
14.
246. Of the eight deliberations studied here, none of the juries unanimously acquitted the
defendant. Jury No. 1 hung 3-3, Jury No. 2 hung 4-2 for acquittal, Juries Nos. 3 & 6 voted
unanimously for guilty, and the remainder hung with 4-1, 4-2, or 6-1 majorities voting for
conviction. See Harris transcript materials (on file with author) (verdict forms accompanying
each transcript document file). The high percentages of hung juries presumably arose from
the 30-minute time limit on deliberations.
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such factor, discussed by every jury and dominating discussion of
some, was a common norm we can identify as a law-based public
value - the private-property norm. For many jurors, this theft case
implicated the strong value they place on private ownership of
property, including the right to exclude others and to do with prop
erty what one wishes - such as leaving items untended indefinitely.
Many jurors expected the law to be applied so as to reinforce this
fundamental property norm and to impose no ongoing obligations
on owners - such as posting signs to forestall assumptions of
abandonment.247
This property norm was so strong and pervasive that for many
jurors it was the explicit baseline of their legal reasoning. Most ju
ries had members who concluded that the defendant failed to per
form an implicit obligation to check with the owner before taking
the bricks,248 an expectation that arises from the property norm.
The norm also cut against the defendant's asserted belief that the
property was abandoned. Jurors who strongly held to the norm
tended either to :find the defendant's claimed belief incredible or, if
honestly held, then unreasonable and worthy of little weight.249
The property norm in its strongest version - expressed by mem
bers of several juries - undercuts the very idea of abandonment,
that is, that ownership can be relinquished by any means other than
express gift or sale and that property can be unowned.25°
247. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 2, at 23; Transcript for Harris Jury No. 5, at
11 ("It's private, it belongs to somebody else. You want to have to post . . . the whole front of
your front lawn no trespassing, private property, . . . just to prevent somebody from walking
off with something that's . . . in your front yard?").
Jurors who held strongly to the private property norm occasionally voiced overt disagree·
ment with the specific-intent requirement, which they saw as undercutting criminal convic
tions for those who take others' property. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 4, at 20 ( I
wish they hadn't put . . . in [the element requiring proof that the defendant intended to
deprive the owner of property]."); id. at 28 ("We're going to have to edit that tape [which
recorded the judge's instructions on specific intent]."). On the other side, one juror who
leaned strongly toward acquittal because she thought the defendant's intent was insufficiently
blameworthy also voiced disagreement with the law. See Transcript for Harris Jury No. 3, at
5-6. More often, jurors did not overtly voice such disagreement but did allow strongly held
property norms to convince them of an application of the intent requirement that supported
conviction.
248. See 'Ii:anscript for Harris Jury No. 2, at 6-8, 11; Transcript for Harris Jury No. 4, at 11;
'Ii:anscript for Harris Jury No. 5, at 1-2, 4, 6, 11; Transcript for Harris Jury No. 8, at 4, 19, 20.
249. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 2, passim (Juror 2); Transcript for Harris Jury
No. 5, at 9; Transcript for Harris Jury No. 6, at 2, 3, 10.
250. See, e.g., 'Ii:anscript for Harris Jury No. 4, at 9, 21; Transcript for Harris Jury No. 5, at
2 ("It's got to belong to somebody."); Transcript for Harris Jury No. 7, at 11 ("I personally
think
property . . . does belong to somebody." (first ellipsis in original)); id. at 20 ("But
how can somebody abandon it when it's on private property?" "That's what I don't get
either. I don't get that at all."); Transcript for Harris Jury No. 8, at 12, 17 ("Even 'aban
doned' doesn't mean that it's not . . . doesn't belong to someone." "All property is owned by
somebody." (ellipsis in original)).
"
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The property norm provides an important baseline for the Har
ris jurors' understanding of the defendant's intent. For those start
ing with the assumption that all property is owned and can never be
taken without first asking the owner, the defendant's decision to
take the bricks necessarily implied that he also intended to deprive
an owner of the bricks.251 The strongest version of this approach,
imbuing the property norm with clear moral content, inferred also
that anyone taking property - and thus knowingly depriving its
owner of it

·

knew also that he was committing a moral wrong� if

not a crime.252
With this baseline assumption about "common moral sense,"
such jurors concluded that the defendant's admission that he took
the bricks met the statutory requirement that the "defendant know
ingly obtained

unauthorized

control over the bricks." Jurors could

reach this conclusion by either statutory or factual construction:
either the mens rea element does not extend to the circumstance
element of no-authorization because extending it allows more ac
quittals and so weakens property rights, or the defendant, knowing
that he did not ask the owner's permission, thereby knew that his
taking was unauthorized.253 Thus, by deciding to take the bricks
"the defendant intended to deprive [the owner] permanently of the
use or benefit of the bricks. "254
Recall again Kelman's critique of interpretive construction of
criminal law doctrine, its relation to factual interpretation, and the
normative premises on which such constructions must be made.255
If the ultimate fit of a factual and legal interpretation hinges in
251. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 7, at 13-14 ("I'm beginning to feel that quite
possibly this guy did have the intent of . . . depriving this guy of his bricks . . . . [T]he intent is
established because he never tried to find out if he could have them. . . . [A]nd he knew that
the bricks were not his."); Transcript for Harris Jury No. 8, at 11-13.
252. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 2, passim (Juror 2); see also '!ranscript for
Harris Jury No. 5, at 1 ("Now I'm sure he knows right from wrong . . . in the sense that . . . he
knew there was a sigu there saying private property, and private property is . . . just exactly
what it says, belongs to somebody else and what's on it, you know . . . belongs to somebody
else . . . ."); id. at 2 ("I'm sure that in the back of his mind that he knew that [the bricks] had
to belong to someone . . . [y]ou just don't do that."); id. at 7; Transcript for Harris Jury No. 7,
at 12-13 (Jurors 5 & 6); id. at 16 ("[H]e knows that that's wrong it says private property.";
"Sigu that says private property . . . to me it's not abandoned, it is private property."); Tran
script for Harris Jury No. 8, at 7 ("[I]t's a terrible thing to think that the man's property was
taken in the first place, you know." "That's true, yes."); id. at 20 ("[P]roperty does belong to
somebody. Now I could conceive of myself maybe going in there and saying, I could proba
bly get away with a truckload of these bricks . . . . But, by the same token, going in there, I
would have to say in my own mind, I know that building must belong to somebody.").
253. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 8, at 4.
254. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 4, at 28; Transcript for Harris Jury No. 5, at
13 ("By taking [the bricks] he willfulyl deprived [the owner].")
255. See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
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large part on the baseline normative vision that it serves, then it
should not surprise us that a decisionmaker would tend to be per
suaded by a construction of an instruction that most readily serves
her sense of the proper outcome. Here, conviction and the underly
ing property norm are served by not extending the mens rea re
quirement to the circumstance element of authorization. Should
that construction seem unpersuasive, the decisionmaker may reas
sess the factual interpretation to conclude that the defendant pos
sessed intent with regard to the lack of authorization as well.256
As part of the property-norm approach, some jurors referred to
the fact that the defendant violated a separate law not at issue the law of trespass.257 The trespass concern is a natural extension
of the property norm, but we can also view the perceived relevance
of defendant's trespass as an effort by the jury at "horizontal coher
ence" within the collection of statutes that protect property. Legis
lation scholars note that courts sometimes tum to statutes related to
the one they must apply - others in the same act or regulating
similar matters - for help in construing the statute's meaning and
ensuring the compatibility of this application with the purposes of
other statutes.258 Comparably, jurors concerned with trespass vio
lations - and motivated by a strong property norm - wanted the
theft statute in

Harris

broadly interpreted. Failure to convict for

this taking, they reasoned, implicitly permits trespass and weakens
property owners' right to exclude others from their land. A coher
ent regime of statutes that enforce property rights will strictly for
bid both trespasses and takings.
While a few jurors with strong property-rights views expressed
no sympathetic understanding of Harris's conduct - any trespass
and taking seemed to them plainly wrong - more jurors voiced
some sympathy. Demonstrating the strength of the property norm,
even jurors who found the defendant an amiable retiree who was

256. Eskridge has offered a gravity metaphor to describe the varying influence public
values may have on statutory interpretation in relation to other considerations. See Eskridge,
supra note 13, at 1018-19. Thus, a public value to which an interpreter is strongly committed
exerts a strong "gravitational pull" toward an interpretation that accords with it, particularly
if the language is unclear. See id. Its pull will be weaker, however, if it conflicts with clear
language. See id.
257. See, e.g., 'IIanscript for Harris Jury No. 1, at 18; Transcript for Harris Jury No. 8, at 4.
258. See EsKRIDGE, supra note 4, at 239 (tracing the horizontal-coherence concern back
to the legal realists and noting that it strives for compatibility not only with current statutes
but also with current norms). See generally id. at 239-74 (distinguishing and discussing hori
zontal and vertical coherence).
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"not a criminal" and who intended no crime still thought he com
mitted a "mistake of judgment" that merited conviction.259
Interpretations based on a strong property norm conflicted with
the familiar premise that moral blame requires the defendant to
know and intend the full nature of his act with knowledge of all
relevant circumstances. This premise supports a mistake-of-fact de
fense, and it led a minority of the Harris jurors to vote for acquittal.
Most juries conscientiously analyzed instructions,260 often listening
repeatedly to a recording of them. They tried to determine whether
the mens rea requirement extended to all elements, particularly the
elements of knowledge of ownership and knowledge of the criminal
nature of the act. They assessed how the defendant's belief that the
property was abandoned fit within their legal analysis and recon
ciled this larger process with their conflicting sentiments about the
wrongfulness of the taking and the basically benign nature of the
defendant's intent.261
The property norm thus provided a moral framework within
which to judge Harris's culpability and, more specifically, the mis
take-of-fact defense that his belief about abandonment raised. The
pervasiveness of references to the defendant's duty-to-ask and to
the unreasonableness of his assumption of abandonment provides a
way to assess whether the defendant's mistake was unreasonable
and thereby his conduct culpable. With the property norm as the
baseline

for

their judgment,

jurors

found

Harris's

mistake

blameworthy.
259. See Transcript for Harris Jury No. 6. Here again we see how jurors sometimes recog
nize the nature of criminal adjudication as a judgment about moral choices. In accord with
Robinson and Darley's findings about citizen sentiments on punishment, see ROBINSON &
DARLEY, supra note 121, at 210-12, jurors thought of their decision in a larger context of just
deserts for the defendant Many wanted the defendant punished very lightly - or made
simply to pay restitution - but still felt a guilty verdict was necessary, either to label accu
rately the nature of his conduct or because the rule of law demanded it. See, e.g., Transcript
for Harris Jury No. 4, at 27; Transcript for Harris Jury No. 5, at 18 ("I think we have to find
him guilty. Now the judge . . . maybe [will] give him a suspension . . . . he wouldn't put him in
jail . . . . "); 'D:anscript for Harris Jury No. 8, at 8-9 ("[I]t's really based on the law [and] to me
the man is guilty. It is an unfortunate thing that he's guilty, and if, in a broader sense, there is
justice, he won't go to jail." "I would have to agree. It's an unfortunate . . . I feel kind of bad
that the gentleman [is guilty] • . . but the law was broken, as far as I'm concerned, and he was
guilty • . . ." {first ellipsis in original)); id. at 25.
260. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 1, at 22; Transcript for Harris Jury No. 3, at 4;
Transcript for Harris Jury No. 4, at 6; Transcript for Harris Jury No. 5, at 14-19; Transcript for
Harris Jury No. 7, at 10, 15; Transcript for Harris Jury No. 8, at 11-14.
261. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 7, at 12-13 (finding that the defendant's mis
taken belief of abandonment negated the intent-to-deprive element). From the deliberation,
it is unclear whether Jury No. 7's members do this primarily as a decision of statutory inter
pretation or more from normative reluctance to convict the defendant without such intent,
though the premise of practical reasoning and dynamic interpretation is that those two are
usually inseparably related.
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In this way, jurors confronted the enduring tension in criminal
law between descriptive and normative uses of the same term. On
the mistake-of-fact issue, they opted for the latter.262 In giving
moral content to the mistake, the Harris juries used statutory appli
cation to make the normative judgment at the heart of criminal ad
judication; at best, their reasoning led to verdicts that were fairly
explicit and plausible evaluations of Harris's character while still
working within the statutory language. One can disagree with the
construction by challenging the jury's choice of norms, but the crim
inal law's equation of liability with moral blame makes statutory
interpretation a necessary means to judge culpability.263
Still, a minority of jurors were particularly concerned that the
defendant's intent was insufficient for criminal liability. For exam
ple, one juror repeatedly expressed the sentiment that "I feel he is
innocent because he was not aware that what he was doing was a
violation of the law."264 But a larger number of jurors clearly felt
bound by a more inculpatory reading of the law, and they felt that
they had a duty to apply it objectively regardless of their personal
disagreement with it or sympathy for the defendant.265 This is not
to say, of course, that jurors who in good faith tried to apply the law
neutrally in fact succeeded and were unaffected by norms or values.
Judges, after all, are criticized for the same sorts of failures.266
The recurrent theme among jurors that the law is objective and
constrains their discretion connects closely with recurring views
about the proper role of juries. A few jurors repeated the dominant
notion from the

Reed jury that jurors

are not "computers" and are

expected to apply the law in light of widely held values and com-

262. The descriptive use, in contrast, would simply inquire whether the defendant in fact
made the mistake that negated the intent or knowledge required to commit the crime defined
in the statute. See FLETCHER, supra note 29, at 395-401, 516-41 (tracing the shift from crimi
nal law judgments as largely descriptive to "the centrality of normative guilt in the criminal
process").
263. See id. at 532-38.
264. Transcript for Harris Jury No. 3, at 13. This juror's sentiment is consistent with psy
chologists' understanding of attribution theory. See FRITZ HEIDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
INrnRPERSONAL RELATIONS (1958); Edward E. Jones & Keith E. Davis, From Acts to Dispo
sition: The Attribution Process in Person Perception, in 2 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL So.
CIAL PSYCHOLOGY 219 (L. Berkowitz ed., 1965). The above sources are both discussed in
FINKEL, supra note 9, at 159.
265. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 3, at 15 (recording several jurors arguing that
the law is and should be fixed and objective, that "there has to be something absolute you
can count on," and that "there has to be something where it's either this or that").
266. For criticisms of judges who claim to apply statutes by such purportedly neutral cri
teria as plain meaning, see, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 4; Eskridge, supra note 13; Frickey,
supra note 4; Zeppos, supra note 4.
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mon sense.261 But in contrast to Reed, most of the Harris jurors felt
the jury's only duty was to resolve factual disputes and apply the
law neutrally, with as little interpretation as possible.268 In the most
pointed example of this sentiment, one juror perceptively argued
that juries should simply apply the law as it exists and that revising
the law should be left to the legislature. In response to a juror who
disagreed with the intent instructions and "resent[ed] having these
qualifications placed on my judgment," four of her colleagues
argued:

Juror 2: That's an issue [to be settled] on a legislative basis rather
than on juries and deliberations, and I still feel that you must work
within the law . . . it's entirely reason.able to change the law, but you
must change it at the right place and at the right time, and not as it
stands.
Juror 5: . . . I agree that you have to stand with what the law says,
regardless of how you person.ally feel.
Juror 6: So you have to buy the judge's [instructions], because he is
theoretically interpreting the law.
Juror 4: Yes, because we can't disagree with those instructions . . . .
[W]e have to go by the charges, but if the charges are wrong, it's not
[ours] to disagree with .
Juror 2: I agree with what you're saying completely.269
.

.

The Harris juries also demonstrate the downsides of both the
literalist approach to statutory application that many jurors initially
favor and the role of public values in statutory interpretation. The
jurors who were most committed to quasi-mechanical law applica
tion also tended to voice least often thoughts indicative of consider267. "But why is the jury, you individuals, brought in and asked to react . . . if not to
provide a human understanding . . . . It seems to me that the reason juries are used is because
a law that's absolute can too easily be misused, and the human element of a jury adds some
relativity to it." 'D:anscript for Harris Jury No. 3, at 14; id. at 16 ("[M]aking such a decision
under the qualifications offered me by the judge really distorts and disillusions what my con
ception of the purpose of the jury is."); id. at 17.
268. See 'D:anscript for Harris Jury No. 3, at 14 (recording two jurors describing the jury's
role as one of settling factual disputes and not to interpret or adjust the law). Harris Jury No.
2 had a similar discussion:
Juror 6: ['That is] a very rigid interpretation.
Juror 2: But, that's the only, that's the only interpretation we can give it.
Juror 4: Well, it's the only interpretation you can give it.
Juror 2: No, it's the only interpretation. It's against the law!
Transcript for Harris Jury No. 2, at 23. Juror 2's approach is particularly interesting in light of
the fact that his jury was given the quasi-nullification instruction that stated the law as merely
"intended to be helpful to you in reaching a just and proper verdict." Juror 2 fits well Conley
and O'Barr's description of "rule-oriented" litigants and judges. See CoNLEY & O'BARR,
supra note 128, at 59.
269. Transcript for Harris Jury No. 3, at 5-6 (fourth ellipsis in original); see id. at 11-12
("[W]hatever you want to do to effect a change [in the law] is entirely up to you, but it all
depends on whether or not you believe that the laws should be changed . . . right here as
we're discussing them or whether or not you think they should be affected through the
legislature.").
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ation of an individualized, careful judgment of the defendant's
culpability. " [W]e are charged with really only one thing," one ju
ror argued. "We are charged with applying the law that was given
to us, by the judge, to this case . . . . Did [the prosecution] meet the
requirements of the law? If they did, the man's guilty . . . . "210 For
many - those who held strongly to the property norm and were
given the general-intent instruction - the literalist approach coin
cided with their personal view of Harris's culpability; that undoubt
edly made them comfortable with the literalist, seemingly common
sense applications. For others, especially those less guided toward
conviction by the property norm or less toward acquittal by state
of-mind concerns, their view that they should apply the law with
little regard for context or consequences reduced the effort re
quired to pursue a moral judgment.
For those who most adamantly endorsed the property norm, es
pecially if given the specific-intent instruction under which the case
for acquittal was strong, the force of this public value led some to
interpret law implausibly, verging on "nullifying" to achieve convic
tion.271 Public-values analysis, for juries at least as much as for
judges, can mean that the decisionmaker allows personal normative
preferences to overcome stronger, more persuasive interpretations
of statutes.272
270.

'franscript for Harris Jury No. 8, at 24.
The strongest example here is probably a member of Jury No. 2, which was given the
specific-intent instruction and voted 4-2 for acquittal. This juror was so committed to the
property norm that he denied property could ever be abandoned, and thus that the defendant
could ever honestly assume that it was. Note here how this background value affects the
juror's finding (or interpretation) of facts. See Transcript for Harris Jury No. 2, at 8, 11-12,
17-18 (Juror 2). That norm led him to mistaken understandings of the specific-intent rule,
such as, " 'knowingly' simply means taking it . . . with the knowledge that he was taking it,
that he wasn't taking it by accident" Id. at 18. He responded to jurors who offered correct
understandings of the specific-intent law with remarks such as, "[D]id he intend to pay the
state for the bricks? . . . He's guilty of not being better informed [that the bricks weren't
abandoned]." The pattern of responses revealed an unwillingness - seen in a few other
jurors, see, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 7, at 18 (Juror 6) - to accept a mens rea rule
that required intent as to circumstance and result elements, a rule that would be insufficiently
protective of private property. See Transcript for Harris Jury No. 2, at 17-18, 21-25 (Juror 2).
272. In his discussion of public-values analysis, Eskridge asks:
Is a public values approach a determinate or coherent approach to statutory interpreta
tion? As deployed by the current Court it is not, and I am not optimistic that another
group of nine Justices would do the analysis any more consistently or coherently. The
upshot of this criticism is that the Justices have a great range of value choices to make
under public values analysis, and that in tum raises a third question. Can the Court
justify its value choices in all these cases? No. My analysis of the recent cases suggests
that the Court's overall set of public values is biased in ways that are hard to justify.
Eskridge, supra note 13, at 1062. Legal scholars' criticism� of judicial reasoning as improp
erly value-laden are too numerous to mention. For two well-known examples from different
perspectives, see John Hart Ely, The Wages ofCrying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE LJ. 920 (1973); William H. Rehnquist, The Notion ofa Living Constitution, 54 TEXAS
271.
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Note on Jury Interpretation of Insanity Instructions

As a final note of comparison to the Reed and Harris juries, we
can look to existing studies of how juries interpret insanity instruc
tions. By directly presenting the issue qf whether the defendant can
be held morally responsible for his actions, insanity doctrine poses a
more overtly substantive problem of application than the simple
theft and possession statutes of Harris and Reed. Jurors must deter
mine at what level the defendant knew what he was doing and what
level of knowledge is required for culpability; they must decide
whether he knew his act was wrong and what wrong means.273
Under another formulation, they also may have to assess whether a
"mental disease or defect" made him unable to "conform his con
duct" to the law.274 None of the standard versions of the defense
lends itself to a plain-language construction that a juror could
mechanically apply without normative construction of the statutory
terms and evaluation of the defendant.21s
The Chicago Jury Project recorded the deliberations of a large
set of mock juries that were given the insanity-plea case United
States v. King.216 In that case, the defendant, who performed ade
quately at his job during the time of his alleged crimes, pled insanity
to charges that he had incestuous relations with his daughters over
a period of years. Findings from these deliberations, drawn from
Rita Simon's account of the study,277 reveal some now-familiar
strategies and considerations by jurors. The King juries discussed
the duties and limits implicit in the jury's institutional role. Like
the Reed and Harris jurors who resisted computer-like judgment by
L. REv. 693 (1976). For a different description of normative biases in judicial thinking, see
Kimberle Crenshaw & Gary Peller, Reel Time/Real Justice, 70 DENY. U. L. REv. 283 (1993).
273. See M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & Fmnelly 200, 211-12, 8 E;ng. Rep. 718, 723 (H.L.
1843); PETER W. Low ET AL., THE TRIAL OF JoHN W. HINCKLEY, JR.: A CASE STUDY IN
nm INSANITY DEFENSE 10-14 (1986); SIMON, supra note 91, at 20-24; see also FINKEL, supra
note 9, at 280-81 (describing from empirical research how jurors seem to "construe" key legal
concepts in insanity instructions, especially the word "know").
274. This requirement comes from the last clause of the Model Penal Code statement of
the insanity defense, which combines components from M'Naghten with the "irresistible im
pulse" test See MoDEL PENAL CooE § 4.01(1) (1985).
275. In one sense, then, jurors' interpretations of these rules are less interesting, because
we easily recognize that the rules call for substantive construction and moral judgment, just
as we know jurors must create substantive meaning for broad standards such as reasonable
ness. This article has focused on the simplest statutes, with the assumption that more com
plex ones only increase and make more obvious the interpretive demands on juries. Still, the
contrast is useful because insanity doctrine is a classic decision rule that overtly raises the
judgment of culpability.
276. King was taken from the actual trial transcript of United States v. King, No. 655-5
(D.C. Cir. 1956); see SIMON, supra note 91, at 50-51.
277. See SIMON, supra note 91.
·
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rote application, the King juries identified for themselves a judg
mental role separate from rubber-stamping expert opinion on the
defendant's sanity. One juror argued, "[W]e don't have to accept
what [expert witnesses] say as truth and that is it. In other words,
they would be deciding for us. We would not be deciding for our
selves what is right in this particular case."278 Another added,
"That is right, you don't need a jury if you are going to take two
doctors' words and say that this man is insane. Why do you need a
jury?"279 Though some expressed frustration at the psychiatrists'
refusal to offer an opinion on the ultimate legal issue of insanity,
the study found that jurors were not inclined to abdicate, in Simon's
words, the jury's "responsibility to the court and the community" to
make the :final legal judgment independently.280
Deliberations also revealed a consistent tendency to consider
the purposes of criminal law generally and the insanity rule in par
ticular, as well as to assess the likely effect of any judgment on the
defendant and on society.281 Although the facts of the case gave
the defendant a relatively weak case, jurors generally tempered a
presumably strong inclination to punish harshly with concerns
about the effectiveness of treatment and the relative benefits of in
carceration versus civil commitment for the defendant and soci
ety.282 With regard to these concerns, deliberations frequently took
a purposive tone, analogous to the purposive method of statutory
interpretation offered by legal-process theorists to describe judicial
practice.283
This approach, however, led jurors to other purposes of criminal
law, - specifically of the insanity defense - thereby partially
diverted their focus on moral culpability. In addition to the
character-based retributive theory of moral culpability, criminal law
has long juggled the competing concerns of crime prevention and
public safety through the goals of deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation.284 The insanity defense in particular raises this issue
278.

Id. at 164.
Id. A third juror added, "If that is the case [i.e., that the jury had to endorse an
expert's opinion], this case shouldn't ever have gone to a jury." Id.
280. See id. at 169-70.
281. See, e.g., id. at 170-74.
282. See id. at 170-73.
283. See generally EsKRID,GE, supra note 4, at 143-51 {discussing Hart and Sacks's purpo
279.

sive theory of statutory construction and emphasizing the considerable discretion remaining
for courts that employ it).
284. See Low ET AL, supra note 273, at 3-5 {discussing the difficulties created for the
insanity defense by the competing purposes of criminal law); SINGER & GARDNER, supra
note 26, at 87-122 (reviewing general justifications for criminal punishment).
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for juries when, as in King, jurors are informed that a not-guilty-by
reason-of-insanity verdict means automatic civil commitment for
the defendant. Simon reported that "jurors claimed that they were
seeking a verdict that would best prepare the defendant, his family,
and the community for the day when the defendant would eventu
ally return to society."285 Even after much deliberation, some ju
rors were uncertain "which alternative, imprisonment or
commitment, was more likely to secure the results they were most
anxious to attain: rehabilitation for the accused and security for
society and for the defendant's family."286 As one example, a juror
who urged a not-guilty verdict argued:

The law is not meant to punish, but it is meant to correct the situation.
I mean we are not helping his family or him or society by putting him
in a prison. The only possible way of helping him and his family and
society is by putting him where he can be helped and that is in a
mental institution.287
Here again a conceptual difficulty in criminal law becomes a
practical adjudication problem for juries. The general verdict com
bines the decision about the defendant's culpability with one on the
justification of civil commitment. This is seen in the common view
of insanity as a decision between punishing, or at least incapacitat
ing, the defendant criminally or civilly.288 This conflation of culpa
bility and therapeutic concerns distracts jurors from the need first
to assess the defendant's blameworthiness in light of his condition
- a moral judgment guided by criminal law - and then to assess
whether civil commitment is justified for medical reasons.289
Despite such purposive concerns, however, deliberations did not
reveal that jurors allowed those considerations to determine deci
sions. More significant, the deliberations revealed a strong concern
for an accurate adjudication of moral culpability and a verdict that
285. SIMON, supra note 91, at 174.
286. Id. at 171.
287. Id. For additional transcriptions of juror deliberations on this issue and discussion,
see id. at 171-74.
288. See FLETCHER, supra note 29, at 540-41 (quoting Herbert Packer that the not-guilty
by-reason-of-insanity verdict is "a direction to punish but not to punish criminally").
289. See id. (noting "[t]he common observation" that insanity merely "determine[s]
whether the social response to the defendant's conduct (condition) is to be imprisonment or
hospitalization," and arguing that this view "combine[s] incompatible issues" of blameworthi
ness and propriety of civil commitment); see also FINKEL, supra note 9, at 286-88 (surveying
scholarly criticism of insanity tests as insufficiently focused on moral judgment and overem
phasizing medical symptoms); cf. Reform of the Federal Insanity Defense: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 390-91
(1984) (statement of Professor Stephen J. Morse, University of Southern California) (criticiz
ing the prevailing insanity rules and debates as pushing "pseudomedicalizations" and creating
"an aura of false precision").
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reflected the defendant's moral culpability. Most juries rejected the
insanity plea and found the defendant guilty. But his mental disor
der was sufficient to make jurors uncomfortable about equating
him with the paradigm of the typical law-breaker, and thus uncom
fortable with their limited verdict options. Simon observed:

[Some jurors] seemed to be searching for a compromise between the
two verdict alternatives provided by the law - guilty or not guilty by
reason of insanity. They were unwilling to find the defendant not
guilty by reason of insanity because they were too impressed both
with the heinousness of the crime and with the rational, calculated
manner in which, to their minds, the defendant carried it out. On the
other hand, for almost the same reasons, they were uneasy about hav
ing the defendant treated as an ordinary criminal. An ideal solution
. . . would have allowed them to find the defendant guilty, but in need
of medical treatment.290
Simon further observed that a few jurors had "not even a shadow of
a doubt about his sanity. But most of the jurors saw and were af
fected by a shadow. In the end, however, the shadow was not
strong enough to relieve the defendant of his responsibility to
society. "�91
The conclusion that jurors maintain attention on the assessment
of moral culpability finds support in subsequent studies of jury deci
sions on insanity issues. Finkel conducted extensive studies with
mock jurors in search of the rationales, or mental "constructs," that
motivate verdicts in insanity cases. He identified two "high-order
constructs" that jurors employed across a range of insanity cases
and that explained most variations in the verdicts for those cases.
Jurors most often employed either a "capacity" construct that fo
cused on whether the defendant was capable of making responsible
choices or. a "culpability" construct that assessed blameworthiness
in light of the defendant's behavior

before

the criminal act.292 To

gether, these intuitiv� approaches strongly indicated that lay citi
zens view insanity as a moral question of responsibility and
blameworthiness. Instructions based on different insanity tests pro
duced little difference in verdict outcomes in Fink:el's studies.293
That likely is a product of both the nature of the cases and the limi
tations of the written rules. Insanity cases, even to lay citizens, are
clearly decisions about moral culpability; criminal law has been un290. SThfoN, supra note 91, at 172.
291. Id. at 175; see also id. at 177 ("(T]he data demonstrate that the jury recognizes the
distinction between a clinical diagnosis and the application of a moral legal criterion, and that
they understand it is the latter which they must use in deciding the case.").
292. See FINKEL, supra note 9, at 288-91.
293. See id. at 292-97.
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successful in capturing a subtle, compelling, normative analysis in
its insanity standards.294 Insanity rules are incapable of a plain
meaning application. As a result, jurors interpret the indeterminate
terms of such rules with help from available social norms that shape
our shared notions of responsibility and blameworthiness.
CONCLUSION: TOWARD A PRACTICAL REASONING MODEL OF
JURY STATUTORY INTERPRETATION - AND
IMPLICATIONS

hs

From the foregoing, we can summarize a tentative collection of
interpretive tools and strategies that jurors employ to apply statutes
and their use for judgments of culpability. Perhaps the most obvi
ous - and to some, the most surprising - is jurors' inclination to
turn first to a plain-meaning or literal interpretation of statutory
language. Even the Reed jury, which eventually settled on an inter
pretation more subtle and context-sensitive than the most common
literal reading, began with several acknowledgements of the "letter
of the law" and serious debate about whether the jury had anything
further to discuss beyond it.295 The Harris juries largely adhered to
interpretations that seemed to correspond to the plain meaning of
the intent instructions, although that language contained such a fun
damental ambiguity about the elements to which the mens rea re

quirement applied that no single meaning is compelling.296

Reed and Harris provide an interesting contrast in this respect.
The Reed jury felt compelled by the defendant's capacity and cir
cumstances to interpret the statute closely in search of a meaning
for the mens rea term that reconciled with compelling justice con
cerns. The Harris jurors mostly were much less inclined by their
defendant's predicament and character to search beyond an ordi
nary meaning for that term's content. They spent much of their
time seeking to define plain meaning with regard to the term's
reach - what elements required intent or knowledge. The

Harris

juries that departed from a more plausible reading did so primarily
to serve a compelling public value - the property norm - that was
the defining background notion of most deliberations, rather than
to assess the defendant's culpability. More often, the property
norm set the moral framework against which jurors evaluated
294. Cf. Greenawalt, supra note 20, at 929, 950 (discussing the limitations of criminal
code drafting that prevent the drafting of rules to cover every fact scenari_o).
295. See supra text accompanying notes 189-96.
296. See supra section IV.B.
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Harris's actions - both his ends, taking the bricks, and his means,
taking without asking - and implicitly his character.
The juries in both cases considered their institutional role, which
helped define the parameters of acceptable interpretive choices and
situated the jury in relation to other actors - police, prosecutors,
legislatures - in the justice system. Yet the consideration of insti
tutional role cut different ways, depending on which role-concep
tion was persuasive. The

Reed jury ultimately used its antiformalist

view of the jury to prompt its close textual interpretation. The Har

ris juries that raised the issue largely concluded that they were obli
gated to seek an ordinary meanll!g for terms and avoid law reform
or result-oriented application. This general inclination to follow or
dinary meaning and attempt to apply it objectively corroborates the
:findings discussed in the earlier review of empirical jury studies.297
Several studies found juries generally applying instructions uncon
troversially except where we would expect otherwise:

in close

cases,298 when given a strong nullification instruction in a morally
compelling case,299 when fact patterns varied widely from prototyp
ical ones - for example, euthanasia prosecuted as murder - or
297. See supra text accompanying notes 96-120 & 160-81. It is also in accord with findings
that people obey and enforce the law unless they have substantial disrespect for it. See, e.g.,
LIND & TYLER, supra note 204; ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 121 (identifying respect
for the law as an important factor in determining how likely one is to obey the law); ToM
TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY nm LAW (1990). Most historical patterns of jury nullification
occur when communities broadly oppose a given law, such as the Fugitive Slave Act, Prohibi
tion statutes, or civil rights laws. See generally Brown, supra note 12.
Drawing a lesson from Reed, we might note that jurors are affected not only by how much
they respect the statute as a general, substantive rule, but also how they respect the law as
applied in this case, or more precisely, the legal officials and institutions - the police officer
or prosecutor - who decided to apply the law and initiate the case. Some Reed jurors disre
spected that judgment, allowing them to struggle more easily with an interpretation of the
statute that would match their instincts of situational justice. See Frontline: Inside the Jury
Room, supra note 1. This no doubt connects with 'fyler's procedural justice points as well:
the Reed jurors thought that the overall justice process here was flawed, though the flaws
resulted from discretionary judgments by the prosecutor and police rather than from any
procedural structure. See Frontline: Inside the Jury Room, supra note 1.

298. Recall Kalven and Zeisel's confirmation of their "liberation hypothesis," finding
that when plausible constructions of the facts could support multiple verdict options, jurors
may give more weight to norms and values. See KAI.VEN & ZEISEL, supra note 14, at 164-66.
For descriptions of comparable decisionmaking behavior by judges, see CARP & RowLAND,
supra note 104 (finding, in fill empirical study of federal judges' attitudes and values, that
such factors affect decisions mostly in close cases); ROBERT SALTER, D oINo JUSTICE 63-79
(1991) (noting, in a first-person account by a judge of how he and other judges decide cases,
that in close cases or when statutes are ambiguous or conflicting, judges are guided by their
values and personal senses of justice - especially trial judges, who know the parties and the
real-life implications of cases).
299. But see Horowitz, Impact, supra note 94, at 452 (concluding that jurors could be
effectively coached into adopting a strict or literal application with a clear argument against
nullification power).
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when the ordinary meaning of instructions conflicted strongly with
widely held social norms.3oo

Reed is an example of a jury compelled, by the ill-fit of the stat
ute to the facts, to explore explicitly considerations and interpretive
strategies beyond apparent plain meaning and rote application.
The

Harris juries

are probably a better example of common prac

tice, but even there we saw the inevitable attention to - or simply
effect of - considerations familiar from judicial interpretation. Ju
ries took at least a brief account of statutory purpose, social norms,
and concern about the final justice of the outcome. Finally, we saw
jurors consider occasional instrumental concerns, such as the incen
tive effects of decisions on prosecutors and on other would-be crim
inal actors, and the effect of decisions on social institutions like
property rights.301 Both the

Reed

and

Harris

cases exhibited the

distinct effect of social norms or public values, which supports other
:findings of the effect of norms or values on jury legal interpretation,
such as Finkel's findings of concern about proportional
punishment.302
Despite the wide-ranging interpretive inquiry that this account
implies, the common-sense meaning of the statute remained the
touchstone for both the

Reed jury

and the

Harris jury.

Other con

cerns often motivated reassessment of statutory terms rather than
rejection of them. This study suggests that juries, like judges, rely
on ordinary meaning - as in Harris - once it is constructed. If the
factual story that jurors have constructed fits the statute well and
does not conflict with strongly felt considered judgments about the
justice of the outcome, then the language of the statute will seem
clear and incontrovertible to the jurors and they will consider little
else.303 This approach is even more likely when juries take a lim
ited view of their institutional authority.
300. See supra section III.B.2 (discussing Fmkel's and Kalven and Zeisel's findings);
supra section III.D.1 (discussing Smith's studies); supra section III.D.2 (discussing Green
wald's and Horowitz's studies).
301. Recall the Supreme Court's repeated references to the jury's function as a check on
prosecutors, judges, and arbitrary governmental power. See, e.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 476
U.S. 162, 174-75 (1986); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 539. (1975); Johnson v. Louisiana,
406 U.S. 356, 373 (1972).
.

302. See the discussion of Fmkel's studies, supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text,
and Robinson and Darley's survey, supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
303. This conclusion finds support in Hans and Vidmar's account of a juror who describes
the constraint she and fellow jurors felt in the statutory language contained in the judge's
charge, despite their sympathy for the defendant's actions. See HANs & VIDMAR, supra note
9, at 156-57.
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Further, the reasoning process by which juries weighed these
competing considerations is largely captured by existing accounts of
judicial practical reasoning. We saw from cognitive science studies
that juries interpret facts as a story within background knowledge
that includes normative assumptions. Studies of nonlawyers' rea
soning styles in court revealed a division between those aiming for
rule-bound, deductive approaches and those with a more contextual
orientation grounded in social norms. From these insights plus the
examination of the Reed and Harris juries, we find that jurors often
test a preliminary sense of the statute's application and case out
come against the range of competing concerns that help evaluate
both the accuracy of the legal interpretation and the justice of the
result. While some jurors strive for a more rote, deductive ap
proach to statute application, we see they are as vulnerable to criti
cism as judges who claim to apply plain meaning. The

Harris jurors

who urged literal application nevertheless had to choose implicitly
the extent to which the intent requirement applied, and they typi
cally did so informed by a strong commitment to the property norm
or a sense of the proper culpability judgment for the defendant. In
short, as practical-reasoning analyses find with respect to judges,
the facts of the case - the story jurors construct - and the norms
it implicates affect either the willingness of a jury to depart from its
implicit presumption for literal statute application or how it will de-·
termine that "plain meaning" in the first place.
Through the examples of deliberations in these two cases, we
also see the necessity of practical reasoning to a criminal law with a
normative conception of guilt. The criminal adjudication, seeking a
judgment on the defendant's character and the moral quality of his
conduct, requires attention to the context and circumstance sur
rounding his actions as well as the law's application. Many of the
factors that juries use to prompt more creative readings of statutes
are precisely the sorts of concerns that criminal law demands.
Checking rote application of ordinary meaning against social
norms, public values, and context-specific facts is not only permissi
ble, it implicitly is required by the nature of criminal judgment.
Given the nature of criminal adjudication, as well as the preva
lence and acceptance · of judicial decisionmaking characterized by
practical reasoning, this study suggests that the basis for many tradi
tional criticisms of the jury is wrong. Typically, juries are criticized
for not applying statutes literally.304 Yet if practical reasoning is
304. A related concern is that juries do not understand statutes, an issue addressed supra,
section III.D.1.
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widely practiced by courts and is inevitable, as its advocates suggest,
and if verdicts are particularized normative judgments of culpabil
ity, we perhaps should worry instead that juries feel too bound by
the apparent plain meaning of statutes and limited conceptions of
their role. That concern is corroborated by studies of lay judges
and litigants, who are often more rule-bound and literalist than ex
perienced judges with legal training.305 We have noted that juries
generally are inclined to apply statutes literally; it may be this incli
nation - and the limited view of the jury's role that it implies that leads some jurors to give the normative component of the cul
pability judgment insufficient attention and seriousness. Given the
documented tendency of juries to approach their task with good
faith, and to attempt to check jury members who stray from their
apparent mandate, literalism that discounts moral evaluation seems
a risk of equal magnitude to that of jurors ignoring the law in favor
of idiosyncratic preferences.
Even though we have left law application to the jury, we incon
gruously have conceived of it, for the jury only, as a rote, uncreative
process. Juries are sometimes misled by that view. This article, in
contrast, has argued that law application, even for juries, is a com
plex, normative process. That conclusion has implications for jury
instructions. In addition to the well-known problems of jury in
structions - written in overly complex language, presented only
orally at the end of trial - we might worry also at how little gui
dance instructions usually give jurors for statutory construction.
'fypically, juries receive virtually no help, save a command to take
the law as the judge gives it and apply it without sympathy or inter
pretation.306 What guidance they do glean from such advice likely
encourages static, literal application, which we should now view as
problematic. We find in traditional instructions the stereotypical
assumptions that juries are at great risk of giving in to sympathy or
emotion and must be constantly urged to follow the law. Studies of
jury decisionmaking - and lay legal reasoning generally - now
305. Conley and O'Barr raise the same possibility from their study of small-claims court
judges, some of whom are lawyers and others of whom have no legal training. See supra text
accompanying notes 133-39. They found one judge, who was not a lawyer and had less judi
cial experience than most judges they observed, who was a "strict adherent" and viewed the
law as an inflexible set of rules he was compelled to apply. In contrast, another judge who
had a law degree and was characterized as an "authoritative decision maker" typically ex
plained his rulings in terms of his personal opinions rather than legal rules. Conley and
O'Barr concluded from their study "that lack of legal training and experience correlate with
the tendency to displace responsibility for decisions onto rules that are beyond the control of
the decisionmaker. Such judges lack the legal acumen and resulting confidence to take more
personal and creative approaches." CoNLEY & O'BARR, supra note 128, at 110.
306.

See supra note 6 and accompanying text.

Michigan Law Review

1268

[Vol. 96:1199

are bringing us ·close to the point at which we should begin rewrit

ing jury instructions based on assumptions with better foundations.

If juries in fact frequently interpret statutes in an effort to achieve a
more perfect judgment than mechanical application would yield, it
is not due to the preparation or assistance they receive from the
court system. The moral nature of criminal judgment, in particular,
implies that we should urge attention to more than literal statute
application. We should consider, in effect, canons of construction
that would be useful and manageable for juries, canons that better
serve the_ normative evaluation of guilt contained in criminal
verdicts.
An attempt to redesign ins'trudtions so as to aid juries' interpre

tive efforts seems at least as likely as existing practice to facilitate

satisfactory resolutions to' the inevitable' tensions - felt by jurors,

litigants, and observers - that come from adjudicating moral judg

ments about varied instances of human conduct under the guidance
of general rules. Judges and justice theorists have long recognized
the need and virtue of judges' ability to mediate application of rules
with case-specific "considered judgments" and an acquired "situa
tion sense." Juries, charged with resolving cases that no other pro

cess has been able to resolve, face the same need. Instructions that
acknowledge and aid the task of interpretation instead of ignoring it

may help.
The

acknowledgement

that juries

must

interpret

statutes

changes the premise of much discussion about how the jury per

forms its job. The issue is no longer whether the jury "followed"
the law or departed from it, because creative, dynamic interpreta
tion is at times necessary, desirable, and inevitable. The question is

the jury's competency at such interpretation. Evidence indicates

that they accomplish the task in much the same way, with much the
same effect, as judges.

